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THE ADAPTATION OF THE FAMILY TO THE CHILD[1].

BEING FREE-ASSOCIATIONS ON CHILDREN'S EDUCATION.

BY SANDOR FERENCZI (BUDAPEST).

THE title which I have given to this paper is rather an unusual one, for we are generally concerned with the adaptation of the child to the family not the family to the child, but our special studies in psycho-analysis have shown that it is we who should made the first adaptation, and the first step in this direction, of course, is to understand the child. Psycho-analysis is often reproached with a too exclusive concern with pathological material; this is true, but we learn much from a study of the abnormal that is of value when applied to the normal. In the same way the study of the physiology of the brain would never have advanced so far as it has without a knowledge of the processes of faulty function; by a study of neurotics and psychotics psycho-analysis shows the way in which the different levels or layers or the different ways of functioning are hidden behind the surface of normality. In the study of the primitive or the child we find traits which are invisible in more civilised people, indeed we stand in debt to children from the light they have thrown on psychology, and the best and most logical way of repaying that debt (it is in our interest as well as theirs to do so) is to strive to improve our understanding of them through psycho-analytical studies.

I confess we are not yet in a position to give precise limits as to the educational value of psycho-analysis, nor to give rules regarding practical details of education, because psycho-analysis, which is ever cautious in giving advice, is primarily concerned with matters which education has either mishandled or left untouched; we can tell you how *not* to educate your child better than we can tell you how to do it—the latter is a much more complicated question, but we are hoping that we shall be able some day to give a satisfactory answer to that too. For this reason in what I have to say I am compelled to be more general in my treatment of the subject than I would prefer, but I can say that the study of criminals, or normal people, or neurotics, will not be complete till we have gone further in analytical understanding of the life of the child.

[1] Based on a paper delivered at a joint meeting of the Medical and Educational Sections of the British Psychological Society on June 13th, 1927.

The adjustment of the family to the child cannot take place till the parents first of all understand themselves and thus get some grasp of the pathology of the mind. Up to now it has often been taken for granted that parents are endowed with a natural knowledge of how to bring up their children, though there is a German proverb which says the opposite: "It is easy to become a father but difficult to be one." The first mistake that parents make is to forget their own childhood; even in normal people we find an astonishing lack of memory of the first five years of life, and in pathological cases the amnesia is even more extensive. These are years in which the child is really at the level of and the equal of adults—and yet they are forgotten! So the lack of understanding of their own past childhood proves to be the greatest hindrance to parents grasping the essential questions of education.

Before I come to my real topic—the question of education—let me make a few general remarks on adaptation and its part in psychical life. I have used the word "adaptation" and I do so because it is a biological term and draws our attention to biological concepts. It has three different meanings—the Darwinian, the Lamarckian, and the Psychological. The first deals with natural selection and is at bottom a 'statistical explanation' of adaptation in that it concerns itself with general questions of survival; for example, the giraffe, having a longer neck, can reach food that shorter-necked animals cannot, it can therefore satisfy its hunger and live to propagate its kind; this explanation is in fact applicable to creatures taken in bulk. According to the Lamarckian view, the exercise of a function both helps the individual to become stronger and passes on the increased capacity to posterity; this is a 'physiological explanation' of adaptation; but there is a third way in which individuals can adapt themselves to their environment, and that is by psychological means. It is probable that there is some alteration in the distribution of psychic forces which makes an organ grow or degenerate. It has become fashionable in America to deny the existence of psychology as a science, every word beginning with 'psych-' is a brand-mark of the unscientific on the ground that psychology contains a mystic element. Dr Watson once asked me to say just what psycho-analysis was. I had to confess that it was not so scientific as behaviourism, viewing science, that is to say, solely as a discipline of the measure and scales. Physiology requires that every change should be measured with an instrument, but the psychologist is not in a position to deal with emotional forces in this way—very slight approaches, it is true, have been made to this goal but they are at present far from satisfying. If one explanation fails it is not

forbidden to try others. One such we owe to Freud. He found that by a scientific grouping of the data of introspection one could gain a new insight just as certainly as by grouping the data of external perceptions derived from observations and experiments; these introspective facts though incommensurate are none the less facts, and as such we have the right to group them and try to find out ways of helping us to something new. By merely regrouping introspective material Freud constructed a psychical system; in this there are of course many hypotheses (but these are found no less in the natural sciences); among them the concept of the unconscious plays a very special part in the psychic system and with its help we reach conclusions which were not possible with the hypotheses of physiology and cerebral anatomy. When the microscope and the kymograph show us that Freud's hypotheses are unsuccessful we shall be ready to resign our claims to science. Dr Watson is of the opinion that one can understand the child without the help of psychology, he thinks that psychology is unscientific and that conditioned reflexes can fully explain behaviour. I had to tell him recently when in America that we would send him white mice and rabbits for analysis but not human beings. But he himself is, without confessing it, constantly using psychology—he is an unconscious psycho-analyst! For instance, when he speaks of a fear reflex in a mouse, he uses the psychological term 'fear.' He uses the word correctly because he knows what fear is from introspection; if he had not known it introspectively, he would not have realized what running away meant to the mouse. But to return to the question of *adaptation*: psycho-analysis brings forward a new series of facts besides those of the natural sciences—*the working of internal factors which cannot be detected except through introspection.*

I will now try to deal with the practical problems connected with the ways in which parents can adapt themselves to their children. Nature is very careless, she does not care for the individual, but we human beings are different, we wish to save the lives of every one of our offspring and spare them unnecessary suffering. Let us therefore turn special attention to those phases of evolution in which the child has to deal with difficulties, and there are a great many of them. The first difficulty is birth itself. It was Freud himself who told us that the symptoms of fear had something to do with the particular physiological changes which take place at the moment of the transition from within the mother's womb to the external world. One of his former pupils used this view of Freud's as a springboard from which to leap to a new theory, and, leaving psycho-analytical concepts behind him, tried

to explain the neuroses and psychoses from this first great trauma; he called it "the Trauma of Birth." I myself was very much interested in this question, but the more I observed the more I realized that for none of the developments and changes which life brings was the individual so well prepared as for birth. Physiology and the intuition of the parents go to make this transition as smooth as possible. It would indeed be a trauma if there were not well-developed lungs and heart, whereas birth is a sort of triumph for the child and surely must exert as such an influence on its whole life. Consider the details: suffocation is impossible, for the lungs are there and begin to expand at the very moment after the umbilical cord is tied, and the left side of the heart, till then inert, takes up its rôle with vigour. In addition to these physiological aids the parents' intuition guides them to make the situation as agreeable as possible, the child is kept warm and protected from disturbing stimuli of light and sound as far as possible—indeed, they make the child forget what has happened, it can make believe that nothing has happened.

Real traumata are more difficult to solve—they are less physiological than birth, they concern the child's entry into the company of his fellow-mortals; the intuitions of the parents do not make such good provision in this respect as they did at birth. I refer to the traumata of weaning, cleanliness, the breaking of 'bad habits,' and last and most important of all that breaking from childhood itself to the adult way of life. These are the biggest traumata of childhood and for these neither parents in particular nor civilization at large have yet made adequate preparation. To go even a step to solve these questions it is necessary to know more intimately of the difficulties of children.

Weaning is and always has been an important question in medicine, it is the change from the primitive way of feeding to the active act of mastication, it is a change of more than physiological, it is of great psychological importance. A bad way of weaning may cause an important deflection in the child's approach to objects and his way of obtaining pleasure, and this may colour a large part of his life. We do not, it is true, know much about the psychology of the one-year-old child, but we begin to get a faint impression of the deeper impressions which weaning may leave. This reminds me of a simile I like to use: even a slight wound, a mere prick of a pin on a single cell, can cause in an organism in the early part of embryonic development not only alterations but a failure of development of whole members of the body. In the same way, if you have a candle in a room and you put your hand between the candle and the wall the half of the room will become darkened—if near the beginning

of life you do only a little thing to a child it may cast a shadow over the whole of its life. It is important to realize how sensitive children are; but parents do not believe this, they do not comprehend the high degree of impressionability of their offspring and behave in their presence as if the child understood nothing of the emotional scenes going on around him. If intimate parental intercourse is observed by the child in the first and second year of life, when its capacity for excitement is there but while it lacks adequate outlets for its emotion, an infantile neurosis may result which may permanently weaken the child's affective life. Infantile phobias and hysterical fear reactions are common in the early developmental years, usually they pass without disturbing later life but very often we find that they have left deep impressions on the mind and character of the child. This much for the more or less passive relation of the parents to the young; we must now examine a situation or series of situations in which the parents play an active part in the intimate concerns of the child's emotional life, and it is here especially that we find how necessary it is for the parents to understand their own minds and instinctual reactions before they embark on the task of 'upbringing.'

The adaptation to cleanliness is one of the most difficult phases in the child's development. It is one that can be very dangerous, but it is not always so; there are children who are so healthy and well equipped that they can deal with the silliest parents, but these are exceptions, and even if successful in dealing with their bad upbringing we too often note that they lose something of the happiness which life can bring. The possible loss of happiness by careless or over vigorous 'training' in cleanliness should make parents and educators pay far more attention than they do to the feelings of the child and appreciate its difficulties. Freud's observations on the emotional changes in the child during the adaptations to the adult code in regard to cleanliness led him to the important discovery that no less than an important part of the character of the individual is formed during this process; put in another way, the way in which the individual adapts his primitive urges to the requirements of civilization in the first five years of life will determine the way in which he will deal with all his difficulties later in life. Character is from the point of view of the psycho-analyst a sort of abnormality. We expect an individual to adapt himself precisely to the details of the current situation, but consider how far this is compatible with what we generally know of character—you know that you can make a person perform an action when you wish and as often as you wish because he behaves like a machine. If you put something into his ear he shakes his head, if you

say a particular thing you know he will also shake his head (physical and psychical reflex, *i.e.* automatic response), he does the automatic thing in response to your cunningly chosen word because it is 'in his character' to do so. I will say something more about character: when I was a student too much importance was accorded in medical circles to inherited characteristics, physicians believed that we were the product of our constitution. Charcot, one of our best teachers in Paris, gave many important lectures on this topic. I well remember a typical incident which illustrates this: one day a mother came to him at one of his *Leçons du Mardi* and wished to speak to him about her neurotic child. He began as always to ask about its grandfather and what diseases he had and what he died of, and about its grandmother and the other grandfather and grandmother and all its relations, and the mother tried to interrupt and tell him of something that had happened to the child a week or year ago. Charcot got angry and didn't want to hear about it, he was intent on tracing the inherited characteristics. We psycho-analysts do not deny their importance, on the contrary we believe it to be one of the most important factors in the aetiology of neurotic or psychotic disease, but not the only one. The inherited tendency may be there but its influence may be modified by post-natal experience or by education. Both heredity and the individual traumata must be taken into consideration. Cleanliness is not a thing inborn, it is not an inherited characteristic, so it must be taught. I do not mean that children are not sensitive to this sort of teaching, but I think that unless taught children would not live in cleanly fashion. We have some views on this point: the natural tendency of the little baby is to like himself and to like all those things which he regards as a part of himself; the excreta are really a part of himself, something between him and his environment. The child has a sort of feeling for his dejecta; and not only children, for normal people share this attitude, too. I sometimes analyse so-called normal people and I have never found very much difference in this respect between them and the neurotic, unless it be that the latter are rather more interested in dirt; and since hysteria is the negative of a perversion, as Freud has taught us, then normality is a sort of perversion. People generally call it abnormal if a person is interested in the excretory function, and most of us *are* to a certain extent during the whole of our lives. Do not let us be downhearted about it, for these primitive functions provide the energy for the great achievements of civilization. If we do not know this and deal with the difficulties of the child crudely and blindly—after the manner of repression—we shall deflect the energies and the reaction will differ according to the

constitutional differences of the individual; one will possibly become a neurotic, another a psychotic, another a criminal, but if we know about it and treat them carefully, let them work out their impulses in their own way to a certain extent and by giving way give them a chance to sublimate their impulses, the way will be much smoother and they will learn to turn their primitive urges to the paths of usefulness. Teachers often wish to exterminate the primitive urges (which are most important sources of energy) as if they were bad things in themselves, whereas if led into good channels they can be used for the good of the individual and for the benefit of society.

The greatest trauma in the adaptation of the family to the child is in regard to its development from the earliest primitive childhood to civilization, not only from the point of view of cleanliness but from the point of view of sexuality. One often hears people saying that Freud bases everything on sexuality; it is quite untrue. He speaks about the *conflict* between egoistic and sexual tendencies and even holds that the former are the stronger. Psycho-analysts in fact spend most of their time in the analysis of the *repressing* factors in the individual.

Sexuality does not begin with puberty but with 'the bad habits' of children. These 'bad habits' as they have been erroneously called are manifestations of auto-erotism or the primitive manifestations of the sexual instinct in the child. Do not be afraid of these manifestations. The word masturbation frightens people immensely. If in consultation —and how often—the doctor's advice is asked about the autoerotic activities of children, he should tell the parents not to take it too seriously; parents have to be treated tactfully on this question because of their internal fears and their lack of comprehension. Curiously what the parents do not comprehend is precisely what the children understand and experience deeply, and what the children cannot fathom is as clear as daylight to the parents. I will explain this riddle later on: it contains the whole secret of the puzzle in the relation between parent and child.

I will for a moment turn from the paradox to the big question of how to deal with the neurotic child. The only way is to find out the motives hidden in its unconscious mind. Several attempts have been made already; a former pupil of mine and of Dr Abraham, Mrs Klein, whose paper on "Criminal Tendencies in Normal Children" appeared in this *Journal* [vol. VII, ii, pp. 177–192], has courageously attempted the analysis of children as if they were adults and has met with great success; another attempt on different—more conservative—lines has been undertaken by Fräulein Anna Freud, Professor Freud's daughter. The

two methods are different, we shall some day see if they can be brought together and the difficult task of a combination of education and analysis solved; at any rate we can say that the beginnings are hopeful.

I had an opportunity recently when in America of studying the methods of a school which is guided by psycho-analytically trained and mostly by psycho-analysed teachers. It is a special school called the Walden School. The teachers try to deal with the children in groups, since individual analysis of each child separately, which would be much better, is out of the question on account of time. They attempt to educate children in such a way that analysis becomes unnecessary. If they have a neurotic child, of course they make a particular study of it and give it an individual analysis and as much individual attention as it requires. I was in particular much interested in the way in which they deal with sex education. The school emphasizes in its conferences with parents the need for answering the questions of children on sex in a simple natural way. But they adopt the "Botanic Method," *i.e.* they use plant analogies in explaining reproduction in the human species.

I have an objection to make against this. It is too *informative*, it is not sufficiently *psychological* in its approach. It may be a good beginning but it does not give full consideration to the internal needs and strivings of the child. For instance, even the most elaborate explanation of where children come from does not satisfy the child, and the way in which they sometimes react to this information is by sheer disbelief in the explanation of the parents. They virtually say: "You tell me this, but I don't believe it." *What the child really needs is an admission of the erotic (sensual) importance of the genital organ.* The child is not a scientist who wants to know where children come from; it is interested, of course, in this question, as it is interested in astronomy, but it is much more desirous of having the admission from parents and educators that the genital organ has a libidinous function, and as long as this is not admitted by the parents the explanation is not satisfactory to the child. The child puts questions to itself like this: how often does the sexual intercourse take place? and tries to compare the answer with the number of children in the family. Then he says, perhaps: "It must be very difficult to produce a child, because it lasts so long." It discovers that the sexual act occurs repeatedly, not once only, and that it occurs with pleasure to the parents; sympathetically, as we say, it feels erotic sensation in its own genitals which are satisfied with certain activities, and it is clever enough to know and to feel that the genital organ has a libidinous function, it feels guilty because it has libidinous sensations at this stage, and there-

fore thinks: "What an inferior person am I to have libidinous sensations at my genitals, whereas my respected parents only use this function in order to have children." As long as the erotic or pleasurable function of the genital is not admitted there will always be a distance between you and your child and you will become an unattainable ideal in its eyes—or the reverse! This is what I meant by the paradox a few moments ago. The parents cannot believe that the child experiences in its genitals sensations similar to their own, a fact which the child is ready to credit in its elders, whereas the child cannot believe that insemination alone can make the child, which the parents find readily acceptable; there is thus a gulf between parent and child on an intimate domestic matter. If a similar gulf developed between a husband and wife we should not be at all surprised that it led to an 'estrangement,' but with the blindness which clouds our vision on nearly all matters connected with the sexual activity of children (due to our infantile amnesia) we expect implicit trust from children while denying to them the validity of their own physical and psychical experiences. Often one of the child's greatest difficulties arises because it realizes that all this high idealism is not true, it becomes disappointed and does not believe in authority. A child ought to believe in authority—in the truth spoken to it by its parents and others, but not to take everything on trust, of course; perhaps I can illustrate this best by saying it in another way, that it is a calamity for a child to grow up to disbelieve.

The Walden School does good work, but of course it is only a beginning. The way to reach the child's mind through the medium of the parents' understanding which they employ is sometimes very good, and in early cases of neurotic difficulties it might be successful. We must remember that the first child analysis was done by Prof. Freud in this way (Little Hans[1]). He interviewed the father of the neurotic child and all the explanations were given by the father. But the father was analysed by Freud, we must not forget that.

The difficulties of adaptation at the age when the child becomes independent of the family are very much connected with sexual development. This is the stage of the formation of the so-called Oedipus conflict. If you just think of the ways in which children sometimes express themselves about this question, then you will find it humorous. The child sometimes spontaneously tells the father: "If you die, I will marry Mother." Nobody takes it very seriously because this is at a time

[1] Freud: "Analysis of Phobia in a Five-year-old Boy" (1904). *Collected Papers*, vol. II, pp. 149–289.

before the Oedipus conflict, that is to say, a period in which the child is permitted to do and think everything without being punished for its sexual thoughts, just because the parents do not comprehend the child's intentions. Suddenly the child, fully believing in its complete freedom, finds that at a certain age such things are taken seriously and punished. In these circumstances the poor child reacts in a very particular way. I will draw an illustrative diagram.



The Ego is the more adaptive part of the personality, the part which can adjust itself to the environment in any particular relationship. Human beings are a part of the environment differing greatly in importance from all other objects of the world and also in one significant feature: all other objects are always equable, are always constant. The only part of the environment which is not reliable are other persons, particularly the parents. If we leave something in any place we can find it again at the same place. Animals do not vary much, they do not lie against their own natures, once known they can be depended on. The human being is the only animal which lies. It is this which makes it very difficult for a child to adapt itself to the parental part of its environment —the most respected parents do not always tell the truth, they lie deliberately, as they imagine only in the interests of the child. But once a child has experienced this it becomes suspicious. That is one difficulty. The other is the dependence of the child on its environment. It is because of the ideas and ideals of its environment that the child is forced to lie. Parents have made a sort of pit for it. The child's first criteria are of course its own, that sweets are good and schooling is bad; then it discovers that another set of standards is firmly implanted in its parents' mind, that sweets are bad and schooling is good, and so forth. The former is derived from its own perceptions of pleasant and unpleasant experience, the latter is thrust upon it by persons who are, in spite of these views, deeply loved. The child, being dependent on the parents physically and in love attachments, has to adapt itself to the new and difficult code. It

does this in a particular way, which I will illustrate from a case. I had a patient who remembered his early life very well. He was not what we should call a good child, he was rather bad and was beaten every week, sometimes in advance. When he was beaten, he suddenly began to think consciously: "How nice it will be when I shall be a father and I'll beat my child!" thus showing that in his phantasy he identified himself already with his future rôle of father. An identification of this kind leads to a change in a part of the Ego, it is an acquirement from the environment and is not inherited; it is the tendency which is commonly called "the conscience." First of all we are afraid of punishment, then we identify ourselves with the punishing authority, next the father and the mother lose their importance for the child because it builds up a sort of internal father and mother. That is what Freud calls the Super-Ego. (See diagram.)

The Super-Ego comes from an interaction of the Ego with the environment; if you are too strict you can spoil the life of a child by giving it a too harsh Super-Ego, therefore I think it will be necessary at some time to write a book not only about the importance and the usefulness of ideals but about the harmfulness of exaggerated ideals for the child. In America the children are very disappointed when they hear that Washington never lied in his life. I felt the same dejection when I learned at school that Epaminondas did not lie even in a joke. "Nec joco quidem mentiretur."

When one little American heard that Washington never lied, he asked: "What was the matter with him?"

I have only to add a few points. The question of co-education, which I had an opportunity to see working in America, reminds me of the time when I was with my friend Dr Jones and some other psycho-analysts in America to listen to the first American lectures of Freud. We met Dr Stanley Hall, the great American psychologist, who said to us jokingly: "You see these boys and girls, they are capable of being together for weeks at a time, and unhappily it is always without danger." It is to a certain extent true. The repression which is connected with 'good behaviour' may cause great difficulties in later life. If you admit the necessity of co-education you must find a better way of bringing the sexes together, because the present way of herding them together socially and at the same time forcing them to repress their emotions easily makes them neurotic. Speaking for a moment of the ways of meting out punishment in schools, I only want to say how necessary it is to get rid of the spirit of retaliation, instead of making it just an educational measure.

The idea I had in coming here was not to talk about the connection between psycho-analysis and education, but just to stimulate you to further interest and further work. Freud called psycho-analysis a sort of after-education of the individual, but in a certain way education is now indebted to psycho-analysis. Psycho-analysis will teach the pedagogues and parents to treat children in a way which makes this 'after-education' superfluous.

[The following took part in the discussion: Dr Ernest Jones, Mrs Klein, Dr Menon, Mrs Susan Isaacs, Mr Money-Kyrle, Miss Barbara Low, Dr David Forsyth.

Dr Ferenczi then replied as follows:]

In answer to Dr Jones's objection, I do not agree myself that measurement is the sole qualification for classing a method as scientific. I said that it was because to share first the opinion of one's opponents is the best way to beat them, therefore I accepted it as a "posito sed non concesso." It is generally regarded as the basis of science to reduce everything to numbers; on the other hand, I really believe that even the best measurement will not make psychology unnecessary. If you had a machine that would project the movements of the brain on a screen, accurately displaying every change of thought and emotion, you would still have an internal experience, and would have to connect the two. There is no way out of the difficulty other than to accept both sides of the experience, the physical and the psychical; to try to dispense with this duality is only to approach the unknown.

In reply to Mrs Klein, I can only add that I think great freedom in phantasy would be an excellent relief for the whole life, and if this is granted to children they will the more easily adapt themselves to the required changes from their own social actions to life in a community. Therefore it is very good to allow children to have full freedom of phantasy, but in order to have it the parents must be on an equal level with the children and acknowledge that they themselves have the same sort of phantasies; but they should teach the child the difference between phantasies and irrevocable actions. Where this freedom is granted there is a greater probability that the emotional difficulties of later life will be lessened. You must permit the fullest freedom to phantasy, that is to say, you must force the child to acknowledge in his phantasy that he is allowed to imagine more superiority than he actually has. He will try to take advantage of the situation, and then perhaps comes a point where you have to use your authority. Only unjustified authority is not

permitted by psycho-analysis. I am reminded of an incident with a little nephew of my own, to whom I behaved as mildly as a psycho-analyst should. He took advantage of this and began to tease me, then wanted to beat me and then to tease and beat me all the time. Psycho-analysis did not teach me to let him beat me *ad infinitum*, so I took him in my arms, holding him so that he was powerless to move, and said: "Now beat me if you can." He tried, could not, called me names, said that he hated me—I replied, "All right, go on, you may feel these things and say these things, but you must not beat me." In the end he realized my advantage in strength and his equality in phantasy, and we became good friends. In phantasy the child should be free, but not in actions. That is the great lesson which education has to teach, where the limitation of action begins; it is not the same thing as repression, and is not harmful for the future of the child, he learns to control himself. The difficulty arises when the child begins to think that he does not want to do things.

With regard to the question as to how to translate symbols to children, we generally should learn symbols from children rather than they from us. Symbols are the language of children, they have not to be taught how to understand them. They have only to feel that the other person has the same understanding of them that they themselves have when acceptance becomes immediate.

I think that is all I can say to-night, and I hope this meeting will be a stimulation for further work. I will conclude with a little story about Prof. Freud, who when anyone comes to him with an objection, instead of entering into a discussion of it, replies: "Excellent, excellent, now write it down and do not waste your interest in discussing the subject with me." Those are my parting words to you, if you make observations and have views on the adaptation of the family to the child—write them down!

FREUD *VERSUS* JUNG:

AN ELABORATION OF A RECENT DEBATE CONCERNING BASIC PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPTIONS[1].

By H. G. BAYNES.

FREUD discovered a new technique for the investigation and treatment of neurotic conditions. He also elaborated a theoretical view-point which in conjunction with the technique is called the Freudian method.

The method of obtaining free-associations by which the mental context of the dream constellations can be reached is an invaluable technical asset, but the whole theoretical system that Freud appended to his discovery is not merely open to question, but belongs in my opinion to a sophisticated metaphysic which is foreign to the spirit of science. The claim which this system makes to be a scientific psychology needs to be scrutinized and its inherent sophistication of attitude exhibited in its true colours. What, then, do we mean when we speak of science?

Science is knowledge gained by systematic observation, experiment and reasoning. Philosophy as a branch of science is defined as "the examination and logical analysis of the general body of fact—a science which both in reason and in history precedes successful dealing with special elements of the universe[2]." Psychology is defined as the science of the phenomena of the mind. I shall have occasion to refer to all of these definitions in the course of my argument.

I have said that the Freudian theory belongs to a sophisticated metaphysic. For the sake of experiment let us permit ourselves momentarily to be transported into a sophisticated logic-light system. If we can find a way out of the model, it may help us to see over the wall of the more formidable labyrinth of Freud.

The model I have selected is the classic sophism of Achilles and the Tortoise. In this unequal contest the tortoise is allowed a start, and we are asked merely to concede that Achilles by virtue of his superior speed is able constantly to diminish the distance between himself and the tortoise. This seems reasonable, and we acquiesce. At this point a fine ear could almost detect the click of the sophist's gate behind us, for we

[1] A Debate on the Standpoints of Freud and Jung, held at the British Institute of Philosophical Studies on October 11, 1927, by H G. Baynes and John Rickman.

[2] *Century Dictionary.*

are now in the system. The race has begun. Achilles starts at *A*, the tortoise at *B*. When Achilles reaches *B*, the tortoise is at *C*, *B–C* being less than *A–B*. When Achilles gets to *C*, the tortoise is at *D*, and so on *ad infinitum*. Although our common sense will rage at the impotence of the hero in his ignominious struggle, we are none the less contained by the premisses we ourselves conceded. Where is the trick? Something must have been overlooked. We failed to examine the hypothesis with which the ingenious sophist baited his trap. Too lightly was it assumed that it represented all the essential factors involved. If the *whole* situation had been taken into account, logic would have produced a truth instead of a tricky sophism. For logic, like mathematics, is only a machine; it can neither increase nor diminish; it brings out nothing but what we first put in.

In the present instance, by limiting the speed of the hero to the bare function of diminishing the interval between himself and the tortoise, we allowed it to be assumed that the receding tortoise was the hero's goal, and by this limitation we made even that goal unattainable.

Now when we mention the word 'goal,' we have chanced upon a real bugbear of the sophisticated mentality. If we release the hero from the toils of the pusillanimous premiss he will of course go springing over the tortoise. But now we have to assume another goal for the hero above and beyond the reptilian one; for with this spring he also leaps out of the sophist's system into the problematic realm of teleology.

This word seems to have the power of evoking superstitious terrors from the dark ages which can apparently pinion the mind from behind and instil into it the dangerous notion of some hypothetical goal of divinity. At heart the scientific sophist is, like Frankenstein, terrified of his own spiritual possibilities. He dare not entertain the notion of any goal at all because his own logic would not allow him to remain with a relative or programmatic goal, but would goad him pitilessly down into his own particular hell, *i.e.* the Absolute.

If I were asked to put the case against Freud in a nutshell, I would say that he consistently views the heroic or divine element in human achievement in terms of a 'reptilian' formula. The 'reptilian' derivation is regarded as a scientific truth, while the heroic spirit is regarded not even as a problematical possibility, but as a mere sublimation product of checked reptilian tendencies. My aim is to show that this way of regarding man is not scientific.

In a recent discussion of the relative standpoints of Freud and Jung, the opener for the Freudian side, Dr Rickman, took particular pains to

dispel the idea that Freud ever had a view-point. According to him Freud had only made discoveries, while Jung had only made a view-point. It would scarcely profit us to argue this point, because it is an elementary condition of the mind that no interpretation of any phenomenon can be made without a view-point. It would be quite idle to deny that Freud has made interpretations. Therefore he must have had a view-point. What interests me especially is not that Dr Rickman said this, but why did he say it? Is it perhaps because the examination of a certain view is likely to disinter the premisses on which the view rests, and can it be that these premisses will not bear too close a scrutiny?

The labyrinth of Freudian speculation—I use the term advisedly since a large bulk of Freud's later writings is self-confessed speculation—and the labyrinthine complications of his over-subtle kind of thought make a detailed critique almost impossible.

If one attempts to distinguish between the content of empirical fact in Freud's writings and the wealth of assumptions which are almost uncontaminated by fact, one finds oneself inextricably involved. I have therefore preferred to attack the system at its foundation. If the foundations are shown to be unsound it becomes superfluous to demolish the superstructure.

First let us review what Freud in fact discovered. He discovered the mechanism of repression. He discovered that the dreams of neurotic persons exhibited the repressed contents. He discovered that the repressed contents appeared to be exclusively connected with erotic tendencies, usually of an infantile or immoral character. He discovered certain infantile sex-patterns which he described in mythological terms (Oedipus complex, etc.) and he discovered the technique of free association by which the mental context of the dream imagery could be brought into consciousness. These discoveries are a very great achievement, and if Freud could have restricted the scope of his work within these empirical boundaries his claim as a pioneer of science could never be impeached. Properly speaking his work is a research into the unconscious sexual components and determinants of the human psyche, a research which any future psychology must take into account. But when Freud goes on to assume that the fact of universal sex-repression has provided him with a formula that adequately explains the immense variety and productivity of the human mind: when, in fact, he erects a psychological system upon a one-sided theory of psychic causality, then reason revolts and challenges his system.

Now the characteristic Freudian attitude to any criticism of the

system is to assume that the objector's reaction to the dogma is motivated by his own unrecognized sexual repression. This attitude is frequently accompanied by a smile of intellectual complacency, not to say superiority, which would seem to imply a very unusual degree of sagacity and insight. This smile is an important psychological sign, and it is by no means peculiar to the followers and colleagues of Freud. It is really a 'cult' phenomenon and it appears when the identification with a given formula has excluded the existence of honest doubt from consciousness. The smile seems to say 'we know,' 'the deep enigmas of the soul are answered.' It is a symptom of over-compensated doubt. In reality it is a smile that is fathered by faith rather than by knowledge. A mind that could plumb those depths where lie the secrets of the human soul would surely not display its awful knowledge with just that smile. This specific symptom must not be overlooked, because it denotes an attitude that conceals unconscious doubt and therefore excludes the possibility of objective discussion. Even were it always the case, that adverse criticism is reinforced by unrecognized sex-repression, this fact does not necessarily invalidate the criticism. But, as a matter of fact, this assumption, that a critical modern mind is still horrified and disgusted at laying bare the 'bones of the ape,' is immensely exaggerated. Only a sophisticated mind is shocked at the facts of his own instinctual nature, and only a sophisticated attitude could continue to assume that perfectly real objections to the Freudian dogma are invariably based upon an unwillingness to accept the 'horrible' truth.

But we must remember that for a decade or more Freud fought almost single-handed against a collective attitude which not only refused all recognition of his discovery, but even added personal vilification to its contemptuous refusal. Is it to be wondered at that these wholesale and barbarous projections thrown at a pioneer, just at the time when objective criticism was most needed, should have left him small inclination to accept that meagre quantity of real criticism that was subsequently offered? But this is a retrospective explanation. As pioneers of a new psychological orientation we neither need nor have any right to expect a general acceptance. But we do want a critical hearing. Our science has been starved of sound criticism. Like every other science psychology can never thrive in the seclusion of the laboratory. It needs a more bracing air where the special can meet and grapple with the general. Only in this encounter can the new acquisitions that our science has already won become incorporated in the general mind of our time.

I have enumerated Freud's discoveries and now, before embarking

upon a critical survey of his theory, I am conscious of a desire to express our profound indebtedness to the man whose psychological penetration and unflagging devotion found and opened the door to the investigation of the unconscious mental processes.

This has already proved to be an incalculable gain both to science and to general culture, but the need to preserve this acquisition from the paralysing influence of a one-sided theory cannot be gainsaid. Ideas, like children, cannot too long survive in an infantile dependence on their progenitors. They too have to live in the world and only through a thoroughgoing criticism do we learn their actual worth.

The first of Freud's discoveries that I enumerated was the mechanism of repression. (The term 'mechanism' is used, psychologically, to denote a psychical activity or process that works independently of conscious direction.) In his valuable retrospect of the psycho-analytic movement published in vol. II of *These Eventful Years* (Enc. Brit. Pub. Co.), Freud writes:

> From the estimation of the phenomenon of resistance there resulted one of the pillars of the psycho-analytic theory, namely, the theory of repression....The impressions and psychic feelings, for which the symptoms were now substitutes, were not forgotten without reason, or in consequence of a constitutional inability for synthesis, as Janet thinks, but had experienced repression *through the influence of the psychic forces*[1] whose success and distinction lay precisely in keeping them from consciousness and excluding them from memory....As motive for repression and also as cause of every neurotic disease, one must conceive the conflict between two groups of psychic strivings....The repression regularly emanated *from the conscious personality*[1] (from the ego) of the patient and concerned ethical and aesthetic motives. Repression affected the feelings of selfishness and cruelty, which may be generally conceived as evil, but above all the sexual wish-feelings, often of the most glaring and forbidden kind.
>
> The symptoms of the disease were thus a substitute for forbidden gratification, and the disease seemed to correspond to an imperfect taming of the immoral elements in man.

In this excerpt from Freud's own writings we can find evidence of that deep confusion of psychological ideas which permeates his whole theoretical system. Having observed the phenomenon of resistance he inferred the existence of "psychic forces whose success and distinction lay precisely in keeping certain contents from consciousness." That is to say, repression is a mechanism which operates independently of consciousness. In the next paragraph he states: "The repression regularly emanated from the conscious personality (from the ego) of the patient and concerned ethical and aesthetic motives."

By thus identifying an unconscious mechanism with the conscious personality (the ego is the '*I*,' that which feels, acts and thinks, every-

[1] Italics are mine.

thing, in fact, which is connected with the self as a conscious being), Freud ignores the first necessity of psychological definition, namely, the necessary distinction between the ego and non-ego.

The conscious personality consists of all those contents and associations organized around the idea of self and throughout which conscious direction prevails. The unconscious comprises everything that is outside this organization. Therefore an unconscious mechanism cannot be described as emanating from the conscious personality. That repression is a fundamental necessity of biological economy is proved by the existence of the rigid sex tabu in primitive peoples. Moreover the repression of sexuality is absolute throughout the whole animal kingdom except for the brief periodic breeding season. How do these facts accord with the statement that repression proceeds from the ego? A repressed content is, as we know, the most inaccessible of all contents to conscious insight. How can this be so if consciousness is the source of the repression? Repression, in fact, is an innate tendency of which the ego is as much the victim as are the instincts.

To ignore the distinctive nature of consciousness means to deprive ourselves of that essential objectivity which is the first desideratum of scientific enquiry. The reader will remember that the function of philosophy was defined as "the examination and logical analysis of the general body of fact—a science which both in reason and in history precedes *successful* dealing with special elements of the universe." Now the terms 'conscious' and 'ego' are ideational contents belonging to that general body of fact. In other words they have a perfectly definite meaning. Freud, apparently without examination or analysis of what these terms generally denote, proceeds to make use of them in a way that contradicts their real sense, and we are led to suppose that he himself is indifferent to the problem. The nature and scope of the conscious function apparently does not interest him. We shall return later to this depreciation of consciousness by Freud. It is to my mind part and parcel of his mechanistic view of the psyche which I have likened to the sophism of Achilles and the tortoise and which we shall have to discuss more fully in its proper place. But before passing on to another aspect of the discussion, it must be pointed out that this identification of repression with consciousness had a most disastrous and far-reaching effect upon Freud's theories. He, naturally, had to conceive the repressed and distorted instincts as attempting by every kind of sly disguise to slip past the censorship of the conscious ego. He actually invented a censor—presumably an unconscious deputy of the ego—to guard the gates of consciousness during

sleep. The morbid symptoms, dreams, fantasies, everything, in fact, that arises from the unconscious, was regarded as a substitute for forbidden gratification. It will be obvious that such assumptions arise from the mistake mentioned above, and become quite meaningless when repression is seen as a factor of inherited social instinct. Repression does not proceed from the ego; it was required by the needs of race-survival. Hence the almost unbearable power of tabu. Like every other instinct, repression is liable to be taken to excess, which means morbidity.

I shall now discuss Freud's attitude to the dream and shall attempt to show that the complicated dream-machinery invented by Freud is beset with this same confusion of thought.

In the same article from which I have already quoted, Freud writes: "The formula—the dream is a (disguised) fulfilment of a (repressed) wish—best describes in principle the essence of the dream." He then adds: "By studying that process which transforms the latent dream-wish into the manifest dream-content (the dream-work), we have been enabled to discover most of the knowledge that has thus far been acquired on the subject of the nature and functions of the unconscious psychic life."

It must be said at the outset that the above formula which purports to describe the essence of the dream seems lamentably poor. The fact that from earliest times dreams have impressed the hearts of men as having a fateful significance, that men deeply versed in the wisdom of life have steered their course by the aid of dreams, that at the most critical junctures in life dreams have often come to men as the very voice of heaven speaking to them, that primitive peoples to this day regard dreams as the voices of the spirits of the dead—these facts, which after all belong to the general body of knowledge, do not seem to have had any weight with Freud in his search for an adequate formula. The sense of a profound significance contained in the dream, as also the inner feeling of freedom belonging to the will are phenomena of the mind and therefore belong to psychology as a science. But Freud takes no account of these things. That is to say, certain quite general facts of our mental life are simply ignored in favour of the deterministic doctrine which puts them out of court from the outset. Perhaps it is the fate of determinism to become so hypnotized by the tortoise that it cannot discern the wings of the heroic spirit of man.

Now I want to draw attention to the term 'wish' in Freud's formula. A wish cannot logically exist without a wishing subject. The ego cannot be that subject *ex hypothesi*. Therefore, either he means that the dream-wish is something that would be wished under more congenial circum-

stances, *i.e.* the embryo of a wish so to speak, or Freud has anthropomorphized the unconscious sexuality and the dream-wish is its offspring. This may seem to be a pedantic objection, but it is not so. An inevitable confusion of thought seems to attend Freud's theorizing, because he chooses to ignore the given conditions under which psychological facts must be viewed. In using the term 'wish' in describing unconscious tendencies, he shows us that he is projecting the character of a conscious process into the unconscious motivation, and is thereby lacking in objectivity. Similarly, when he uses the term 'disguise,' we are tempted to ask who invents and arranges the disguise. To assume that the dream-content is disguised because its application is not clear reminds us of the Yorkshireman on the continent, who assumed that the Parisians were talking gibberish in order to make a fool of him. But what was it that blindfolded Freud to the real meaning of the dream? He had already found a key which had given him access to part of the dream-content. He had recognized the presence of sex-allusions in dreams, and this fact provided him with his hypothesis. I think it is true to say that as soon as Freud had this key in his hand his objective judgment forsook him. He proceeded to apply this formula to the whole content of the dream, and everything that could not be made to agree with it was ignored. This hypothesis with regard to the dream is precisely similar to the sophist's hypothesis with regard to Achilles. They are both true so far as they go. But because neither of them embraces the whole of the facts, they both falsify reality and consequently leave us unsatisfied. The whole machinery of disguised wishes, of manifest and latent content, of distortion effected by a dream-censor, is a complicated network of rationalizations required for the support of the all-too-inadequate formula. It would be hard to find a scientific hypothesis that demanded a more elaborate rationalistic paraphernalia for its justification, or a greater credulity for its acceptance. I make bold to say that the 'dream-work' elaborated by Freud is an ingenious theoretical artifact which reveals nothing about the real nature of the dream, but only the intricacies of the mind that invented it.

During the past twenty years and more Jung has developed a most delicate and penetrating technique of dream-interpretation which has long since dispensed with this cumbersome paraphernalia, and which by honouring the dream as an organized expression of the mind allows its meaning to speak. By this I simply mean that the total value of the dream tells, the values sensed by intuition and feeling as well as those of the intellect. In the making of the Freudian mechanism the dream itself

had far too little say. To understand the language of dreams we have to become attuned to the mind of primitive man. What does this involve? Not a mere laying aside of the rational prejudices of the civilized mind, but an attitude of complete receptivity in order to learn what the uncivilized can teach. Living beside him, watching his constant use of metaphor, of crisp dramatizations, of oblique allusions, his complete innocence of abstractions, his plastic unity of expression—thus can we get an insight into the mind of the primitive and thus we can also understand the language of the dream. For it is the same.

The oblique expression is the natural one. No uncivilized man speaks directly to the point. But this natural obliquity is not a disguise. That is a rational interpretation of an essentially irrational fact. If Freud had discovered a potsherd covered with the hieroglyphs of a language still unknown to science, he would not have permitted the assumption that the unknown scribe had employed this figurative language in order to disguise his meaning. He would resort to this hypothesis only if a practical joke were suspected. And yet by identifying the repressive agent with the ego he converts the latter into a grotesque figure of authority, suggestive of an old-time pedagogue whose canings and impositions evoke in his victims only a genius for evasion and practical jokes. In a recent work[1] Freud has introduced the Super-ego—derived from the father—which, by reason of its ancestral connotation, somewhat mitigates the inadequacy of his original conception.

It is a tragic fate that the pioneer who rediscovered the dream, that most enigmatic and energetic expression of the soul, should have failed so cruelly to understand the value of what he had found. In his haste to rob it of its meaning he constructed a machine that macerated the husk, but the living kernel of the dream escaped him.

I must now refer to another vital factor in psychological investigation, which Freud seems to have misconstrued, and which is especially calculated to put a bandage over the eyes. I refer to the peculiar character of the relationship between patient and analyst.

One of the most important of Freud's discoveries was the free-association method by which the patient was encouraged to talk, apparently at random, around the figures presented by his dream. By this means the context of the dream-drama could be spread out in the light and the connections established between the dream and the hidden stream of mental life from which it arose. Now although these associations are apparently free from rational censorship, they are none the less

[1] *The Ego and the Id.*

strongly influenced by suggestion. Freud was on the *qui vive* for the subjective determinants that gave rise to the free associations. But he overlooked one essential thing. And this was the overwhelming influence of his own personality upon the patient. He supposed he had isolated the patient's psyche and had obtained the ideal laboratory conditions in which the patient's mental mechanisms could be studied in complete objectivity. But he could not exclude his own influence from the experiment. And this he failed to take into account in appraising the dream and the associated material.

This is the more remarkable because Freud had himself emphasized the infantile character of the transference relation. The most outstanding feature of an infant's relation to the parent is a plastic suggestibility—'réagibilité' better describes the character of this relation—to the expectations and views of the parent. Whether the expectations are assumed or real, the child is constantly reacting to them.

Under the influence of the transference the patient becomes profoundly suggestible to the analyst's personality and view-point, and the fact that Freud had a certain formula, that meant a very great deal to him, undoubtedly acted like a powerful selective stain, drawing sexual associations to the front, while keeping those that would not tally with the formula invisible. I have myself treated a patient who had previously undergone a Freudian analysis. She confessed that, in order to please her analyst, she had fabricated a circumstantial history of early sexual traumata involving both her brother and her father. Her analyst eagerly availed himself of this material, explaining her neurosis as determined by these entirely fantastic events. Another example of a similar kind was a man whose neurotic troubles were the result of homosexual adaptation which had distorted his whole character. I very soon realized that the association-material he gave me was selected material. When I drew his attention to this fact he explained that, whenever he had any dealings with a hetero-sexual individual, there was an automatic reaction to the hetero-sexual orientation, whereby the normal homosexual associations were repressed. Often, he told me, when going over the dreams afterwards, he was shocked to discover how much material had been unconsciously withheld. It took me several interviews before he was able to counteract this habitual reaction and give me the whole material. These are not exceptions, they represent a perfectly regular occurrence, as regular in fact as the transference. Not only are the 'free' associations affected by the analyst's standpoint, but the character of the dreams undergoes a striking transformation through the

influence of a new conscious standpoint. Patients, who have previously been analysed under the Freudian method, have shown me the dreams they had had during this phase, and I can well understand that the Freudian analyst can find a constant verification of his dogma in these dreams. For they are full of sexual symbolism, although often accompanied by an ironical intonation. Whereas in a new atmosphere, where the sexual dogma no longer prevails, the dream regains an individual freedom of expression.

Jung discovered the unavoidable influence of this personal factor when experimenting with word-association tests. He found that the personality and sex of the experimenter introduced an incalculable factor of variation. On one occasion he was experimenting with a colleague using the electro-galvanometer. He asked his colleague to think of something disagreeable, and a very slight response was elicited. Then Jung asked him if he had had in mind a certain incident that had occurred that morning in the hospital. Immediately there was a vigorous oscillation of the needle. The content in the mind was apparently identical in both cases, since Jung had happened to light upon the thing his colleague had had in mind. But in reality the content had acquired a strong emotional tone through the factor of relationship. Dynamically, therefore, a content that is known or shared by another person has an entirely different energic value from one that is not shared. Furthermore, the particular individual with whom the content is shared forms another specific factor. From such observations Jung realized that it was quite impossible to exclude the personal equation in any psychological work. He accordingly decided to take it fully into account. But this conclusion involved certain consequences. Scientific method has always insisted on the necessity of establishing absolutely rigid conditions in which the observed phenomenon can be verified and re-verified. Freud, like all Western scientists, was schooled in the mechanistic causality of the natural sciences. Given certain causes and conditions, certain results will always be obtained. It was the most obvious and natural thing for him to assume that the same scientific method and doctrine would hold good for psychology also.

Here, I think, he made his chief mistake. He assumed he could obtain the necessary constant conditions by which scientific objectivity could be obtained. The incalculable individual factor is incompatible with this condition of constancy and it was consequently suppressed. No analytical method can ever be devised that will satisfy rigid laboratory conditions. The very nature of the investigation makes this impossible. Hence we are merely deluding ourselves when we attempt to force

psychological research into a tradition which is essentially unsuited to the nature of its material.

The followers of Freud make great play with the term 'psycho-analytical method.' Freud has actually dropped into the habit of speaking of psycho-analysis as though this abstraction perceived, recorded, made conclusions, and affirmed facts with a pontificial inviolability and regularity. If we are indiscreet enough to investigate why this scientific automaton should be pushed forward so ostentatiously in the writings of the Freudian school, we are struck by a very surprising coincidence. The automaton seems to grow, like Frankenstein's monster, by virtue of a persistent and numbing depreciation of human personality. Even the individuality of the different analysts engaged seems to be engulfed by the automaton. Thus, on the one hand, we find an almost ecclesiastical apotheosis of the method, and, on the other, a constant tendency to reduce human personality to the level of elementary human fractions. These twain are complementary phenomena and, in my view, they form the most damning testimony against the dogma which is responsible for them.

Human personality is a tremendous fact and any psychological dogma that tends to diminish its importance by a fanatical insistence on a particular method is self-condemned. Now in the analytical relationship the interplay of two personalities is the essence of the situation, and the effects produced by this relationship call for the most delicate conscious handling. No patient will react in identically the same way to two different analysts, even though they practise the same method. The material will be different, the reactions will differ, the whole demeanour will respond in the most unmistakable way to every nuance of the personal situation. This change is naturally all the more striking when another psychological view-point comes into the arena and new vibrations deeper than the personal are brought into play.

Like every other form of repression, this repression of the personal factor in the Freudian dogma has its teleological aspect. What is the scientific ideal, then, which could operate so powerfully as to exclude from consideration one of the most essential factors in human psychology?—an ideal that was apparently taken over unquestioningly by Freud as a necessary postulate of scientific thinking.

Again we must say it was the mechanistic tradition. In his opening statement of the Freudian position, Dr Rickman laid especial stress on the rigid determinism of Freud's method, and he left a very distinct impression on my mind that he identified the term 'scientific' with the

deterministic hypothesis. This identification is quite commonly assumed, but the grounds for such an assumption are by no means sure. I must here refer to those definitions that I mentioned at the beginning. "Science is knowledge gained by systematic observation, experiment and reasoning." Psychology is "the science of the phenomena of the mind." Now determinism is a "doctrine which holds that human actions are uniformly determined by motives acting upon a man's character and that he has not the power to choose to act in one way so long as he prefers on the whole to act in another way." This doctrine is itself a mental product, a phenomenon of the mind which, by the requirements of science, must be systematically investigated. It is not an *à priori* condition of all minds, since many highly intelligent minds in the West as in the East are equally convinced of the reality of freedom. It is in fact a way of interpreting experience. As a psychological phenomenon the experience of the sense of freedom is universal. It is only the interpretations of this experience which differ; the determinist explaining it as a delusion, the voluntarist as real. It does not lie within the province of science to decide the issue between these two rivals. But it does lie within the scope of psychology to take note of the experience and to enquire into the grounds upon which the different interpretations rest.

I pointed out earlier that no interpretation of any fact was possible or even conceivable without a view-point. A manner of interpretation reveals a certain way of viewing things. There is a German word *Weltanschauung* which expresses this basic psychological attitude. As Jung has observed in a recent paper: "*Weltanschauung* is a most distinctive word and can hardly be translated into any other language. For it not only expresses a conception of the world, but at the same time the distinctive manner and form with which a man views the world. Thus there is an aesthetic, religious, romantic, practical *Weltanschauung*, to mention only a few of the possible attitudes." Having shown the similarity between the concept 'attitude' and *Weltanschauung*, Jung continues: "What, then, is to be understood by attitude? Attitude is a psychological concept which designates an especial grouping or ordering of the psychic contents that is orientated either by a goal or by a so-called governing idea." As psychologists, then, we are not so much concerned with determinism as a doctrine, but rather with the deterministic or mechanistic attitude. We have now shifted our point of attack to something behind the doctrine, as it were, something more fundamental.

The deterministic attitude regularly approaches the psyche from the angle of causation. It is governed by the past, by history. It is always

seeking behind the present individual moment for its derivations and historical antecedents. It assumes that if all these past determinants could be known the present psychological moment would be completely explained.

At this point I would like to explain why I associate the singular depreciation of human personality, to which I alluded above, with the deterministic attitude. How does the relation between analyst and patient figure in the Freudian schema? It is conceived as an infantile transference of the patient to the analyst, whereby the infantile experiences, attitudes, and memory-contents of the patient can be brought to light. That is to say, it is a purely historical or retrospective interpretation of the relation, which omits to take into account the active influence of the analyst's personality and basic attitude upon the selection and presentation of these infantile contents. In focusing exclusively upon the past determinants, we exclude not only the present but also the future determinants.

The rigid determinism of Freud will not allow the existence of future determinants. Theoretically Freud has conceived libido as purposive in character, but he is apparently satisfied with this purely general conception. Nowhere in his writings does he envisage the problem of any specific goal, or function, or aim of the libido beyond that of direct or vicarious gratification. The picture he throws upon the screen is only focused and clear on the historical plane. It either becomes vague or else abruptly stops at the point where history flows into the actual present and on into the future. The causalist view-point always tends to assume that, because the present psychic situation can theoretically be explained from discoverable historical determinants, the future in like manner is absolutely determined. But the will provides a point of departure, a new beginning, which is not determined historically. Thus a deterministic attitude will necessarily be blind to the whole horizon of future possibilities in its effect upon the psyche. The future possibilities are so to speak already contained in the undeveloped capacities of the individual. They are germinal realities; and nothing, as we know, is more potent than an embryo. It compels devotion with all the authority of the future race. But to admit the force and reality of future possibilities means to allow a final or purposive conception of psychic processes. The vital importance of Jung's conceptions in handling the real problems of life is that they embrace this purposive orientation of the libido.

It will be seen then that the historical interpretation of the relation

to the physician, as a repetition of the infantile situation, is only a partial view of the case. The patient's actual situation is an impasse; the libido is seeking a goal, a way out. The impasse is broken only through a gradual weaning process, by which the growing power of a future determinant attracts libido away from the historical determinants. The physician is the way towards that goal. The libido can be released from the neurotic past for the purposes of the future personality *by way of the analyst.* That this is a true reading of the case is shown by the nature of the images that are projected upon him. He becomes the father, the medicine-man, the priest, the initiator, the deity, etc., that is to say, the one who knows the way, expressed in varying mythological terms.

These images would be rather meaningless unless viewed in the light of the expectations aroused by the analytical process. These expectations appear very exaggerated if taken literally, but when we remember that the analyst is the guide into the world of the unconscious, where the major portion of the patient's values and possibilities lie wrapt in the mummy wrappings of the past, it is not difficult to understand why the transference expectations should be expressed in mythological images. These expectations are aroused not because the analyst represents a certain method, nor on account of this or that personal distinction, but because he represents the gateway to that understanding of the unconscious where the 'buried treasure' lies hidden. The retrospective view-point only sees the repetition of an infantile position *vis-à-vis* the father, a daily confirmation of the Oedipus-complex or some other sexual pattern. But why? What is the purpose and function of the transference?

The attitude peculiar to the transference is perfectly appropriate and necessary when viewed, not merely historically, but also from the view-point of the future and the present. A man who sets out to climb a dangerous and unfamiliar mountain, or to penetrate unexplored territory, or to fly over the Himalayas, would show an attitude to his guide or pilot not at all unlike the transference-attitude met with in analysis. There is, of course, this difference that the neurotic patient is sick and, therefore, displays a relatively greater dependence. It can be objected that a sufficient aim is admitted in the hope of a cure. But the neurosis is itself the result of the lack of a positive goal or value in life. Thus a permanent cure depends upon the possibility of the way being discovered, by which that positive value can be realized.

Another character of the deterministic attitude is to dwell upon the structure and topography of the psychic apparatus rather than upon its function. Freud has invented a most elaborate apparatus with a quite

speculative topography, but his conception of psychic functioning is entirely inadequate. One cannot escape the impression that his interest is confined to the problem of causal derivation and does not concern itself with the problem of teleology. This absence of curiosity, as to why the psyche functions in specific ways, would be unaccountable were it not for the deterministic prejudice which ignores such questions as superfluous.

I have said enough, I think, to demonstrate that the deterministic or exclusively historical attitude is not scientific, since science cannot afford to exclude any factors whatsoever which determine the nature of the living process. A temporary exclusion of vital determinants both in the present and in the future may be necessary in order to confirm or verify a particular formula, but a total exclusion is not scientific; it is merely fanaticism. In this connection I would like to repeat some observations made by Dr J. S. Haldane in a lecture on the Fundamental Conceptions of Biology. He says: "Structure depends on environment and environment on structure, and if we attempt to separate living structure from its active environment we simply fail. Form, composition, activity and environment are inseparably bound up together." In another place he says:

> If we attempt to resolve the life of an organism into a number of separate processes we reach no intelligible result.... The wholeness in the phenomena of life is not merely externally imposed, as in the case of a machine; and if we neglect the inherent element of wholeness we are also neglecting life itself.... By studying the responses of renal excretion, of respiration, of circulation, of blood composition, of the nervous system, and of every other organ and tissue in the body, to changes in environment, we can discover how each organ or tissue plays its part in life as a whole, but if we leave out of account *life as a whole* because this consideration savours of teleology we reach nothing but an unintelligible jumble of unconnected observations.

I quote Dr Haldane at some length because he is attacking the same mechanistic laboratory attitude that I am criticizing in Freud. He says if we take a living organism out of its natural environment and study it under rigid laboratory conditions—such as we are told are essential to the psycho-analytic method—in order to obtain exact data, we are no longer dealing with the organism as a whole, but only with its structure. This is a perfectly sound procedure, so long as there is no danger of confounding the structure thus observed with the total individuality of the living organism.

Science being empirical must always avail itself of hypotheses that limit the field of the problem to be investigated. The danger, however, is a very real one that the hypothesis, whose chief service lies in circumscribing the field of enquiry, begins to assume the air and dignity of an independent science, denying any validity to those other hypotheses that are required to complement its inherent limitations.

As an example of this process we can name the organic or physical hypothesis in medicine. Man having a body, disease will be traceable to a bodily cause. This hypothesis circumscribes the field of research and therein lies its immense fruitfulness. But when this hypothesis is identified with the science of medicine so that any other possible hypothesis comes to be regarded as unscientific, it becomes a creed. Many other hypotheses could serve equally well to limit the field of research, such as: Man is a moral being, or a spiritual being, or an emotional being, and therefore disease will have a moral, or spiritual, or emotional cause.

Science in the real sense as "knowledge gained by systematic observation, experiment and reasoning" aims at complete knowledge, and does not exclude any hypothesis that is systematically followed out. Therefore I must repeat my indictment against the deterministic Freudian dogma. In so far as this dogma is regarded as synonymous with 'scientific,' whereby any other possible hypothesis comes to be regarded as 'unscientific,' we must expose this pretension as an attempt to create a vested interest, or a cult. For such a pretension is entirely foreign to the true spirit of science, which is never bigotted, arrogant, or partial. It is a product of culture, and distils the devotion and freedom of culture. Science is an instrument, not an end in itself. When it assumes an inquisitorial mien and forces the irrational nature of the living being into an arbitrary and rigid formula, it is no longer science, but a crude spirit of barbarism. Science will not tolerate a theory that crushes the individual psyche with its winged powers into a procrustean bed of sophisticated assumptions. The psychology which is inspired by the spirit of science has to be as plastic, as manifold, and as comprehensive as the psyche itself. It can never be a simple, rule-of-thumb, formularized method. The scientific method developed by the exigencies of the natural sciences has failed to provide a basis sufficiently wide and elastic to embrace the essential facts of psychic experience. A realization of this fact would be the foundation stone of the psychology of the future, which by including every aspect of the human mind will deserve to be called the servant of man.

While at work on this paper I chanced to read a very able editorial article, entitled "Science and Philosophy," in *Nature* (Oct. 22nd, 1927). The author has expressed much the same ideas, and has stated the general problem far more ably than I could do. He writes:

"The last twenty years have seen the foundations of physics torn up and rebuilt, and the change has come about not only by the press of new knowledge, but also to a great degree through keen, hard thinking about the fundamental conceptions of the science, through true philosophical criticism, carried out by the physicists and mathe-

maticians themselves. We can no longer rest content with the simple materialistic schema which satisfied Descartes and Laplace." Further on he says: "The mechanistic method, however, is itself an interpretation of Nature. It is, to use Dr Chalmers Mitchell's own words about vitalism, 'a proclamation of a belief and not an inference from observation.' Its sole justification is the practical one, that it does up to a point help us to understand the activities of living things. But there are other methods of explanation possible, and it is unwise to rule them out as unscientific. Since physics has found a revolution in its fundamental concepts necessary, it seems dangerous for biology to cling to the cast-off beliefs of the nineteenth century physicists.... The time is indeed ripe for a critical revision of biological concepts. We need not fear that this will lead us into mystical by-ways. It is probable that there will always be something left unexplained—even Dr Mitchell doubts the possibility of the part interpreting the whole—but clear thinking not only about the facts of observation, but also, more important still, about our own methods of interpretation, will help to reduce and render manageable the mysteries of organic life and evolution.... Let clear thinking and logical scrutiny be applied not merely to the generalisations resulting from observation and experiment, but also to the underlying conceptions, the basal philosophies, in accordance with which these generalizations are formed. Let us scrutinize everything—even our most cherished scientific principles."

These are wise words, and they are the product of a new epoch of scientific thinking which has already dawned. Our quarrel with Freud must not be misconstrued as a polemic of rival methods of psychological therapy. It goes far deeper than that. It arises from a need for a fundamental restatement of psychological conceptions. It may be objected that this is the province of philosophy. I would reply that it is precisely the divorce of science from philosophy that makes Freud's whole theoretical position so inadequate. Let me quote again from the article mentioned above:

Shall we call this criticism of conceptions science or philosophy? This brings us to the heart of the matter, and to our tentative conclusion, which is that the nineteenth century divorce of science from philosophy is good for neither side, and that co-operation should now be the order of the day. The benefit will be mutual.... In the recent discoveries both in physical and in biological science, there is ample material to keep the philosopher busy for years. The man of science for his part can learn much from philosophy. He can learn how biassed and provisional his views of Nature may be, how difficult it is to get rid of irrational presuppositions which may colour all his thought.

The writer of this article has biology chiefly in mind when he urges the need of a fuller collaboration between science and philosophy, but if he were to turn to psychology, he would surely find that 'need' imperative. Yet however valuable it would be to achieve the desired co-operation between the scientists on the one side and the philosophers on the other, the synthesis that is needed most of all in psychology is that between science and philosophy in the individual psychologist.

Philosophical deliberation is not as a rule an outstanding factor in the equipment of the extraverted scientific investigator, and, therefore, it was hardly to be wondered at that Freud should have taken over the mechanistic hypothesis from the scientific inheritance of the nineteenth

century. Furthermore, the isolation which bias and prejudice forced upon him in the first decade of his research was most unfavourable for that co-operation with a deeply philosophical mind which he most needed. In spite of this isolation, however, the possibility for such a co-operation actually came across his path. For Jung has by nature a philosophical temperament, the shoot of a tree that for generations produced philosophers and physicians in regular succession. But the disparity of mind and basic standpoint proved to be too great and the possibility never ripened. Freud became increasingly isolated from every view-point and scientific labour other than his own, while Jung went on to lay the foundations of the new science in broad psychological conceptions, which were commensurate with the emerging culture of a new epoch.

As an example of this difference of attitude, I must refer to Jung's fundamental conception of the general or collective unconscious. Freud at first, just as much as Jung, was struck by the inexplicable depth and power of the influence of the parental image operating as a fate throughout the individual's whole life. "Reason," said Jung, "does not allow us to attribute this fateful effect solely to the influence of infantile memories of the actual parent." Behind the personal memories he inferred the existence of a racial factor, an inherited function-complex arising from general human experience in the age-long past. The significance of the father-principle is concerned not merely with the image of the father in the personal past, but with the father-imago, a racial engramme, the power and authority of which is the expression of its untold antiquity.

Freud agreed that this inference was born out by empirical observation, but he argued that such a concept was not scientific. He might have said that a concept of such range went beyond the limitations of the mechanistic hypothesis to which he was wedded.

Jung, as we know, could not confine his mind within a nineteenth-century straight-waistcoat, and with real regret he parted from Freud. He elaborated the concept of the collective unconscious to embrace the whole sphere of inherited function-complexes, which he termed 'archetypes,' by means of which the historical continuity of all human experience exists as specific psychic tendencies or ways of functioning in the individual psychology. The validity of this concept is based upon an immense variety of empirical observation and clinical experience, and its value is shown by the fact, that it is being assimilated by the progressive scientific and philosophic thinking of the new epoch.

As an example of Freud's amazing detachment from the thought and

work of other minds, I must quote a passage from one of his later works, in which almost furtively he opens the door himself that Jung had invited him to open over twenty years ago. He writes[1]:

> All the experiences of life that originate from without enrich the ego; the id, however, is another outer world to it, which it strives to bring into subjection to itself. It withdraws libido from the id and transforms the object-cathexes of the id into ego-constructions. With the aid of the super-ego, though in a manner that is still obscure to us, *it draws upon the experiences of past ages stored in the id*[2].

This is a good example of the labyrinthine thinking I alluded to earlier, but I have selected it for another reason. It is inconceivable that Freud was unaware of the fact that another worker in the field of psychology had already elaborated a comprehensive concept of the 'stored experience of past ages,' but his habit of aloof detachment is now so strong that Freud does not even mention the fact, that at this point his speculation comes into agreement with the conclusions of another worker in the same field.

Again I must repeat this exclusiveness is not scientific. We shall find that this same attitude has hindered Freud from gaining a full appreciation of the significance of dreams. It is quite impossible, for instance, to believe that he was unaware that in the most ancient cultures, as well as among primitive peoples to-day, dreams are regarded as bearing a prophetic light upon coming events. Wise men of all ages have regarded dreams as intuitions concerning things not immediately accessible to consciousness, and particularly in relation to future happenings. In contenting himself with his formula, "the dream is a (disguised) fulfilment of a (repressed) wish," Freud either excludes or ignores this whole weight of human feeling and reflection as though it were mere idle superstition and childish fantasy. That is to say, the *consensus gentium* has no weight with him. He shuts it out as of no account. As has been shown by Jung, the *consensus gentium* is a valid proof concerning the actuality of certain profound facts of our psychic life, as, for instance, the experience of God, of freedom, of love, or such ideas as immortality, fate, etc., which are based not upon empirical evidence, but on the *consensus gentium*. Hence a psychology that excludes the latter can deal with only a very partial field of human experience.

The *consensus gentium* in all times and among all unsophisticated peoples has maintained that impressive (māna) dreams proceed from the soul or that they are the voices of the spirits speaking to men. But deterministic science has no place for the concept of the soul. Freud's

[1] *The Ego and the Id.* Hogarth Press, p. 82.

[2] The Italics are mine.

apparatus includes a pre-conscious, an unconscious, an ego, a super-ego, a censor, and an id, but nowhere is there a place for the human soul. Is it altogether surprising then that the human soul has no place for this incomprehensible apparatus of Freud?

To round up my argument I propose to introduce a living human witness. The woman, whose dream I give below, is by no means a merely pathological case. She is a married woman, with fine mental power and rich imagination. She had had matrimonial difficulties and when she came to analysis she was suffering from considerable mental disturbance, which showed itself in anxiety states and a morbid guilt-complex. When she had this dream she was a year or two over 40, and had submitted herself to a Freudian analysis with real earnestness. Her analyst was a woman assistant of an American analyst of some standing.

She dreamed that she was in the woods and came to a pool of slime. She picked up some of it and said to the man following her: "Isn't it beautiful?" There were other people following along, but she went first. The path became narrow and went along the side of a brook that ran in a narrow ravine. Suddenly there appeared a beautiful pheasant to the left of the path, but when she looked closer she saw that it had a newspaper tail. She was disappointed, but went on, and then another pheasant came out from behind a tree. This one had a perfect tail. She walked on, and, suddenly, blocking the end of the defile was a huge lion. She was terribly frightened, but when she stood a moment the lion spoke, and then his head changed into that of Socrates. Socrates now said to her: "You must always worship God in the sun."

The critical associations to the dream are as follows:

Slime was associated with botany. She had just recently discovered the world which the microscope reveals. It was an entirely new dimension in her experience and conception of Nature.

The pheasant was associated with one she had seen some years before in a wood when walking with a man who was "over-sensitive to Nature in the abstract, and blind to human realities and responsibilities." The pheasant had impressed her as strikingly beautiful.

The newspaper tail was associated with newspaper in an ill-kept water-closet.

Socrates was perhaps the most important figure in her mental world. He represented a light-bringer, a piercing sun-like mind, a supreme representative of the logos-principle.

The dream impressed her so deeply that she took it to the analyst with a keen anticipation of learning its meaning. Anyone at all versed in the Freudian method will observe that the dream-material lends itself in

some respects to a reductive interpretation. In the treatment of the dream her analyst interpreted the slime as faeces, and even went so far as to explain the patient's new world of botanical interest as a disguised indulgence in anal-erotic phantasies. The pheasant with the newspaper tail gave her another opening for the anal-erotic explanation. But her *tour de force* was reserved for Socrates. This figure she interpreted as a symbol of the analyst under whom she (the assistant) was working, and around whom, out of deference to the theory, the patient's anal-erotic fantasy begins to play in its search for a father-surrogate.

The whole dream, in short, was an anal-erotic phantasy. No attempt was made to deal with the dream as an impressive experience, or to explain why a dream that is concerned with repressed infantile phantasies should express these desires in such impressive, even religious images, or why deep feelings should be aroused by them. Dreams of this character have real power. This one, for example, was powerful enough to sever her interest with the whole Freudian schema, and, eventually, to send her across the Atlantic to find out whether Jung could understand her dream and help her to find her way.

I would like to point out that, although this dream contains obviously morbid allusions, the purely reductive approach does not do justice to the kernel of the dream. Now let us be simple enough to forget about 'dream-distortion' and 'censorship' and 'disguised wish-fulfilment,' and ask ourselves at each step: What does this mean? What can we learn from this image or that association? Remember that the dream language is the primitive language of metaphor, and that every part of the dream is referred not to outer objects, but to the dreamer's own psychology. Now let us see if we can discover what the dream is saying.

The defile is an analogous situation to the birth channel; that is to say, the dream states that the psychic situation is a fateful one. When once the birth-process has begun and the defile is entered, there is no turning back. The stream, of course, represents the direction of the libido which she is constrained to follow.

The essence of the dream is a process, a movement. The dream proceeds from the wood, suggesting the possibility of lost direction, and the pool emphasizes the idea of stagnation. The neurosis is a condition of stasis. Thus the stream running through the defile suggests a prospective way out of a neurotic stagnation. On the human plane there is also a procession headed by the dreamer. She is followed by a man—a characteristic opposite-sex representative of the unconscious—and many others. This means that the dream has a collective or general, as well as

a personal reference. All the elements of the psyche are taking part in the process.

Now what has happened just recently that relates the dream to the actual present? She has taken the plunge into this new world of unconscious life and meaning which analysis has begun to bring into focus. It is a crucial step, because the analytical goal to know and to understand the morbid side of her psychology does not necessarily stop there—Achilles can also leap over the tortoise. All the dormant, unlived possibilities of her nature—the chained and buried titans under Olympus—may begin to rouse from their long slumbers and seek a new gateway into the light of day. This new dimension of understanding and self-knowledge is indicated by her attitude of interest in the pool with its vegetation[1]. The dream uses this metaphor because, in reality, the microscope has just revealed to her the unsuspected marvels of the vegetational underworld. Analysis can easily figure in a dream as a microscope or a telescope; that is to say, an apparatus that has the power of making, what was before invisible, visible. Her delight in the new discovery is clearly expressed when she shows the slime to the man.

This seems to me a most important point in her self-realization. She needs to apprehend the facts of her own nature and her strong neurotic tendency with a microscopic exactness and objectivity, and this the reductive technique can achieve; but at the same time she has to say good-bye for ever to the sophisticated, two-dimensional valuation of the slime as just slime. The knowledge of the contents of the personal unconscious is rightly and necessarily repressed, unless one is prepared to see the unpleasant facts of one's own nature in a new perspective. This perspective is obtained by a new insight both into nature and into one's own inner workings, whereby a new relation is won between the isolated, auto-erotic world of the personal unconscious (symbolized by the pool) and the world of the impersonal and general, towards which the stream is leading her, beyond the defile whose exit is guarded by the lion.

The incident of the pheasant is important, but it can be understood only when referred to a particularity of the woman's psychology. It alludes to a vivid moment of sensation, as though she had then for the first time really seen the splendours of a cock pheasant. This moment occurred when she was walking with a man, whom she described as being "over-sensitive to Nature in the abstract, and blind to human realities and responsibilities." Thus a vivid contrast was presented to her mind,

[1] N.B. Collections of water symbolize the unconscious, *i.e.* the element whose content is hidden.

of the especial beauty with which nature's largesse invests the erotic motif in certain birds, and the highbrow detachment of her companion. Now what is the pheasant saying to her? Here it must be interpolated that the patient herself is an introverted intuitive type, and is therefore liable to undervalue that whole aspect of reality for which the function of sensation holds the key. There was also in her, as in most women, a tendency to mistake intellectuality for intelligence, just as most men are liable to mistake the meretricious for the genuine in the sphere of the erotic. This inferiority on the side of objectivity would mean a liability to prefer an opinion, an assumption, or a rationalistic explanation to the labour of independent observation and keen, balanced thinking. Dreams reveal the fact that woman has an inferior masculine figure in her unconscious (a compensatory figure to the image of the divine or perfected man), which manufactures assumptions and opinions of a collective type. The quality of these *à priori* assumptions has been described by Jung as accredited or mass views. He has applied the term 'animus' to this ambivalent masculine representative of the feminine unconscious; while the corresponding feminine figure in man's unconscious he calls the 'anima.' I have introduced these considerations because the pheasant utters a very salient warning, if the ear is attuned to the dream language. The especial grace and magnificence of the erotic motif in such birds as the pheasant is manifested in the tail, and it is just this splendour that in the first bird is changed to a newspaper. We have observed the fact that the erotic libido in woman, when checked of its natural expression, is very liable to go into a kind of compulsive intellectuality described above as animus opinionating. It is a kind of specious collective thinking, which can completely shut out objective reality, particularly, therefore, sensation. The man she was walking with in the wood represented just this dangerous aloofness from immediate and human realities.

The psychological result of such an auto-erotic regression of the libido would be a depreciation of eros, the true principle of woman. This cheapening of eros is beautifully shown by substituting an old newspaper—collective opinionating par excellence—for the pheasant's tail. Moreover, the association with the water-closet underlines the comment on her auto-erotic inclination.

The pheasant, therefore, represents a real psychological danger she has got to encounter, since this sophisticated kind of thinking can completely extinguish a true appreciation of life and can rationalize away value and wonder and greatness with the 'nothing but' method of depreciation. This poison kills the spirit, and it is the presence of this

possibility in her psychology that explains the intense resistance she felt to the 'nothing but' interpretations of her analyst.

There is a very definite positive indication that she can overcome this most subtle danger in the fact that she sees the pheasant again, and this time with a perfect tail. Nothing less than an erotic renewal or rebirth is symbolized here. Now let us follow the movement of the dream further.

Her new objective interest in the slime (product of the neurotic stagnation) and the warning about the danger of auto-erotic animus-thinking lead up to the terrifying lion at the exit of the defile. These symbols are preparing her, as in a kind of initiation, for an altogether new horizon. Just as the child emerges at birth from a secure contained state into a world where it is exposed to perils, risks, and experiences of an absolutely new order, so the emergence from the contained and little world of the personal into the vast horizons of the impersonal or racial unconscious is fraught with very real danger. To plunge unprepared and without understanding into the primitive levels of the collective unconscious means to go right over into insanity. Therefore the exit is guarded by a lion, a racial archetype of supreme and terrifying power, mythologically identified with the sun[1]. The lion is the dynamic, while Socrates is the ideal, aspect of the symbol. Hence they belong together. The lion represents the overwhelming energy and power contained in the universal primordial image, power which can seize hold of the reason with the grip of an *idée fixe* or a paranoidal delusion, or inspire the greatest poems and deeds of heroism. It is, as Jung has shown in his *Psychology of the Unconscious*, a sun-symbol, containing a supreme intensity of libido, *i.e.* psychic value.

Socrates symbolizes the principle of logos, the objectivity of a poised and vigorous mind, which can cut and clarify and express in broad and comprehensive concepts things that, to a darker and more primitive reason, are vague and monstrous and unseizable. The Socratic mind is like the sun. It brings things out of vague and shadowy darkness into the clear definition of light. It is the sun of consciousness.

If panic should seize her now and she turns to flee from this new world of mental experience, she will probably become insane. The lion will devour her. But if she goes on faithful to the principle of consciousness, she can gain the Socratic spirit and become a 'child of the sun,' the source of energy and light.

The central meaning of the dream is contained in the final message spoken by Socrates. Socrates speaks from that world in which Christi-

[1] The Zodiacal sign Leo stands in the month of July, the zenith of the sun's power in the Northern hemisphere.

anity had not yet dawned. He calls her back to an earlier conception of God before the Christian vine had spread over the earth, and had shut man away from a direct and pristine contact with Nature. He calls her to behold the earliest symbol of God, back to the beginning of thought, in order to bring to light a more comprehensive conception of God than that of traditional Christianity. Her neurotic stagnation meant a world without God in the sense of a supreme psychological value.

It is self-evident that the dream is concerned with the religious problem. Accordingly, it more accords with the spirit of science to say that the lion represents the dynamic aspect of God[1], than to say that her interest in the slime is a disguised wish to play with faeces.

For a time this woman was well-nigh overwhelmed by the unconscious, but she held on, and with the help of Jung's amazing insight and understanding she is now in full and imaginative possession of a keenly balanced mind.

There is, of course, a great deal more in the dream that I have not touched upon—a dream of this impressive character is really inexhaustible, and every attempt to interpret its meaning only leaves its essential mystery the more unfathomable—but I have sketched in enough of the general psychological portrait to show that such a dream would be grossly misunderstood if subjected to an exclusively reductive treatment.

The dream is a kind of portrait in which invisible traits and tendencies are thrown in figurative guise upon the screen. The work of interpretation is, of course, an art more than a science, though like every art it rests upon certain general principles which are the province of science. The best practical test of a dream-interpretation is the same that we apply to a portrait, namely: does the interpretation give a truthful and balanced likeness of the patient as a whole?

The riddle of the dream has puzzled the wisest heads of every age, and although we may be somewhat nearer the solution to-day, the riddle still remains. Why is it that nearly all the investigators who have grappled with this enigma have proclaimed, in equally confident tones, an answer that is at variance with all the rest? I need not enumerate these various and manifold solutions. Psycho-analytical literature abounds with them. If the dream were an objective phenomenon we could prove that one of these solutions was true empirically, and that the falsity of the rest depended upon inaccurate observation. But the dream is a subjective product, and consequently certain important elements go to the making of it which are invisible to a purely empirical eye. If, for instance, I am regarding my own dreams, there is one essential

[1] Psychologically, the idea of God represents a supreme psychic value.

factor which my training in natural science has not prepared me to observe. And this is my own conscious attitude, or—to use the more expressive German word—*Weltanschauung*. Jung was the first psychologist to realize the essential importance of this factor in the investigation of the unconscious mental processes. He observed the fact that a thoroughgoing examination and re-valuation of the conscious attitude exercised a profound influence upon the dreams. He was also the first to realize that a deep and unprejudiced study of one's own dreams produced an essential alteration and renewal of the conscious attitude.

May I remind the reader that the gravamen of my criticism of Freud is that by consistently undervaluing the importance and meaning of consciousness his psychological conceptions are alien to the spirit of science.

Not only did he fail to see that the interpretation of the dream was conditioned by the attitude with which his consciousness viewed the dream, but also that the individual intensity and range of the conscious function is a paramount factor in the actual construction and quality of the dream-material.

Just as he failed to realize the constant and intimate reciprocity existing between the personality of patient and analyst, so he also failed to realize the intimate reciprocity between the nature of the unconscious activity and the moral consciousness of the subject. I use the term 'moral' advisedly in this connection, because valuation is the essence of consciousness, and morality, in the truest sense of the word, is wholly concerned with values.

Naturally if we were able to regard a neurosis as a localized psychological disorder, we would also be justified in regarding the analytical method as a purely medical technique, for which the problem of consciousness or of *Weltanschauung* would be altogether superfluous. But no scientist to-day with any real knowledge of neurosis could conceivably regard it as a localized disorder. It is, as we know by bitter experience, a wrong way, and therefore a wrong view of life. We are not allowed to rest with a medical technique that excludes the broader and deeper issues with which the problems of our neurotic patients challenge us.

There is none-the-less a disposition in medical circles to try to limit the terrain of psycho-therapy to a specialized technical procedure. I should like to quote some remarks of Jung in a recent paper[1] upon this disposition.

[1] "Analytical Psychology and *Weltanschauung*," in *Contributions to Analytical Psychology*." Kegan Paul & Co., 1928.

"There are many scientists," he writes, "who avoid a *Weltanschauung*, because this is supposed not to be scientific. But it is manifestly not clear to these people what it is they do. What actually occurs is that they purposely leave themselves in the dark as to their guiding ideas; in other words, they remain on a deeper, more primitive level of consciousness than that which would correspond to their full conscious capacities. A certain criticism and scepticism is by no means always the expression of intelligence, rather the opposite; especially when a person uses scepticism as a screen to cloak his lack of *Weltanschauung*. Not infrequently it is a deficiency in moral value, rather than intelligence. For one cannot form a view of the world without viewing oneself, and therefore in the same way as one views the world, one also views oneself. No small courage is demanded for this task. Hence it is always fatal to have no *Weltanschauung*. To have a *Weltanschauung* means to make an image of the world and of myself, to know what the world is, and who I am. Literally this is impossible but *cum grano salis*, it means the best possible knowledge....If the image we make of the world does not reflect back upon ourselves, we can be content with any sort of beautiful or diverting sham. But such self-deception has the effect of making us unreal, foolish and ineffective. Because we are fighting with a false image of the world, we are overcome by the superior power of reality. In this way we discover how essential it is to have a carefully founded and worked-out *Weltanschauung*. A *Weltanschauung* is essentially an hypothesis, not a creed."

A satisfying *Weltanschauung* necessitates a highly differentiated consciousness. I have already emphasized the fact that, whether we like it or no, the general attitude and standpoint of the analyst has a powerful determining effect upon the whole analytical process. Since, therefore, the question of *Weltanschauung* cannot be excluded under any considerations, we are not permitted to ignore the problem of conscious differentiation. This is not a side issue; it is central, and by it analytical psychology will be judged.

In his work, *Psychological Types*, Jung undertook and carried out the first systematic research of the various characteristic types of consciousness. It is a masterly analysis and description of the differentiated, as opposed to the merely elementary, aspect of the psychic process. He showed in careful historical studies the relation between a man's philosophical outlook (his *Weltanschauung*) and his psychological type. This work has been almost completely ignored by Freud and his school. The importance of this fact must not be ignored. For it indicates that the problem of differentiation has not yet entered the Freudian horizon.

The situation is exactly analogous to that created by the discovery of Copernicus. The geocentric assumption is the natural and instinctive one, and Ptolemy was able to explain the movements of the planets very ingeniously on this hypothesis. Only very gradually, and against great resistance, did the heliocentric hypothesis gain a foot-hold in men's minds. It was hard to give up the static conception of the earth as the centre of the universe, because we are identified with the earth. It is our inevitable standpoint. Men found it hard to conceive of motions or relations that they could neither see nor feel. But in precisely the same

way a man is identified with his own conscious function. It is his inevitable standpoint. Therefore a condition of constant invariability can easily be assumed concerning the conscious function, and only those motions and modifications of the psychic process be taken into account that present themselves to consciousness. I do not of course mean to imply that the Freudian psychologist does not perceive the fact that different individuals perceive reality in different ways. But I do assert that he is not sufficiently curious about these variations to modify his psychological conceptions so as to include this factor of individual and typical differentiation. Jung's work on the types has brought this whole problem of psychic differentiation into the sphere of scientific classification, and psychologists who venture to ignore this fundamental addition to our knowledge of the mind are choosing to remain on an inferior level of consciousness—a phenomenon that surely demands some explanation.

In practical analytical work the question of function-type and basic attitude are considerations that are absolutely essential to a correct psychological orientation. These are determining factors which operate over the whole psychic field, whether conscious or unconscious. How, then, are we to explain the fact that a whole school of practical psychologists finds it possible to forgo the use of perhaps the most delicate and illuminating instrument of their craft.

Modern psychology is in possession of a new instrument, the full potentialities of which is still to some extent unknown, but our scientific conceptions must be based upon those eternal realities of our psychic life, to which every mature human being can testify. Our science must be great enough to contain the greatness as well as the littleness of man.

Jung saw the greatness of the spirit of man, and he could not be satisfied with concepts that dealt solely with his elementary origins. Who will throw a stone at the scientist who risked his repute and standing among the orthodox rather than deny that greatness? He claims the right to use the heuristic principle for what it is worth. He claims that since the mind is purposive, psychological science must embrace this fact. Jung, in fact, is great enough to create concepts that accord with man as a totality. He will not accept the alternative that man must fit into an inadequate formula or doctrine, because it has been called 'scientific.'

In conclusion I would like to quote the words of a modern seer, Herman Melville, whose works are shot through with a visionary fantasy, which often amazes one with its range and depth.

I quote a passage from that strange work *Mardi*, which if syste-

matically explored might teach us much of the deeper life of the unconscious. He says:

> And that which long endures full-fledged, must have long lain in the germ. And duration is not of the future, but of the past; and eternity is eternal because it has been; and though a strong new monument be builded to-day, it only is lasting because its blocks are old as the sun. It is not the Pyramids that are ancient, but the eternal granite whereof they are made; which had been equally ancient though yet in the quarry. For to make an eternity, we must build with eternities; whence the vanity of the cry for anything alike durable and new; and the folly of the reproach—Your granite hath come from the old-fashioned hills.

A fundamental psychology must free itself from quasi-scientific notions that, at bottom, are symptomatic of a transitional moment in man's development, and take hold of the eternal nature of man, namely, those things which always have and always will characterize the human mind. Always in explaining the past man has formed some notion of a cause, and always in his concern for the future he has formed some notion of a goal. Thus the causal and the final conceptions of psychic events are given in the fundamental or eternal nature of man. Both views are therefore essential and, notwithstanding the resistance of the intellect to admitting the existence of two equal and opposite principles, their indispensability cannot be denied. The factor of opposition is not merely an opinion; it underlies the very nature of reality, and therefore a fundamental psychological conception, as Jung has shown, must always embrace a fundamental pair of opposites.

ON SOME OF THE STANDPOINTS OF FREUD AND JUNG.

By JOHN RICKMAN.

At the 'Debate'[1] on "The Standpoints of Freud and Jung" I employed my time in exposition of the discoveries of Freud and took occasion to remark that he had no view-point peculiar to himself but worked on that shared by scientists generally, namely, determinism. In science this same determinism they now say fails to explain some events in the atom, so we must now modify our dogmatism or rather dogmatic attitude—born of long success—and say that determinism is *not* now the one and only standard of science; but returning to the non-determined events in the atom, one wonders how they would have been discovered without a long application of determinist methods, so, for the sake of the future of science (to reduce the chances that people may erringly say a thing is not determined when it is) it behoves us all to work on with the determinist principle, counting it no loss but a gain if by our own efforts we are proved mistaken sometimes and thereby a philosopher is made happy[2].

At the debate before mentioned the topics centred about sexuality. In his 'Elaboration' Dr Baynes has put his finger on the most important matter of *transference* on which I confess to have laid too little stress in my exposition. In this phenomenon the Freudian sees evidence of an automatic repetition of infantile attitudes expressing both a desire for sexual gratification and an inhibiting impulse (conscience—also acting automatically). What brings about the misery in the patient is that both these things (desire and inhibition) are acting at cross purposes and both are unconscious, the effect being to prevent the individual from obtaining complete discharge of instinct tension. I believe there is not a word of this description at which Dr Baynes would cavil, though he and I might differ as to the emphasis to be laid on this or that point.

[1] See footnote, p. 14.

[2] In his definition of science (p. 14) Dr Baynes omits an exceedingly important element, if not the most important, namely the *principle of minimum hypothesis*. My chief complaint against Jung and his school is that they are in haste to introduce hypotheses with the largest possible scope and are negligent of hypotheses that are designed to explain particular groups of *otherwise unrelated* mental events.

But he would say it did not express enough, it did not for instance take account of a synthesizing element in the psyche. It does not, but of that later. In addition he notes in the relationship of physician and patient that "new vibrations deeper than the personal are brought into play" (*vide* p. 25). On this matter I am not prepared with evidence as I have myself not experienced anything 'beyond' personal relationships (I count my relationships to myself—narcissism, self-love—as personal), but it would surprise me if these deeper than personal vibrations, if such exist, were not of the order of events in the atom, *i.e.* events of which we can have opinions but no knowledge till an analysis of mind has been carried into the region of the infinitesimal, which is the province of those analysts of matter, the mathematical physicists. Dr Baynes should count the Freudians as his allies in bringing him a hope of definiteness in regard to these extra-personal relationships, just as he should regard the old school physicists as his helpers in establishing his non-determinism on an extra-philosophical basis.

In the *handling of the transference* the Freudian and Jungian methods stand in the strongest contrast. Every action of the patient in the phase of transference represents to the Freudian a repetition in action of an impulse once experienced psychically. It is the analyst's task to bring this to the patient's attention and get him to recollect the earlier psychical experience, in other words, something in the past has to be found to *match* the present experience. It follows from this that the less the analyst shows himself or his personality, the more he is a blank screen on which the patient may project his phantasies, the more exact will be the reproduction of the old experience. It will also be noted that the analyst has to do no more than detect and match two things produced, a new mental experience (centring on himself) and an old one (centring on some person in the patient's past). His self-effacement has to be as complete as possible in order that the patient's own characteristics may be thrown out in the strongest light.

The Jungian analyst, if I interpret Dr Baynes aright, plays a different rôle. He knows where the 'buried treasure' lies hidden, *i.e.* in the 'collective unconscious,' and he can put the patient in touch with it; furthermore, the patient knows of the analyst's power to do this, and his dependence on the analyst is a result of the latter's superior knowledge of these sources of power, just as a passenger is dependent on the aeroplane pilot who steers him over the Himalayas (p. 28). The stress falls here on the knowledge of the pilot and the ignorance of the passenger; but knowledge and ignorance of what? And what con-

stitutes the difference between the two persons? We will take the latter question first. Dr Baynes holds that the neurotic lacks a goal or value in life, so presumably—since the blind do not lead the blind—the analyst has a goal or value which he can communicate, and this leads us back to the first question, namely, the thing of which there is knowledge. I believe it resolves itself into a mystical experience, a sense of communication between person and person through extra-personal channels, namely, through the person and presence of God (the Creative Force of the *élan vital* school, a supreme psychic value, according to Dr Baynes) in whose keeping lies the Future Determination of present events. If this rendering of Jung's position is correct, it becomes at once apparent that his view is separated from Freud's by the widest of gulfs, for the latter can at best promise the patient a limited improvement (namely, that which can result from straightening the patient's past entanglements) whereas the former (Jung) offers him the unlimited possibility of attuning himself to the Collective Unconscious, the medium through which the Divine is made manifest.

In the Freud-Ferenczi theories the mind is conceived as divisible into two polarities—the ego or integrating part which is in touch with the outer world, and the id (libidinal in Freud's narrower, not Jung's wider sense) which is instinctual, has no particular integrating quality and is not directly in touch with the outer world. Dr Baynes lays stress on the psycho-analysts' preoccupation with the libido and overlooks the great importance which they attach to the ego functions. For instance, the notion of the transference as an *automatic* repetition of past experiences is derived from the interpretation of the ego's part in the business. The integrating functions of the ego are, in psycho-analytic practice, not found susceptible of direct influence, the most that can be done being to remove hindrances to their action. 'Psycho-synthesis' in the Jungian sense is not practised because no one has yet found a way of doing it (or if he has he has not published his technique). The synthetic power of the ego manifests itself in transference in the form of *inactions* rather than actions, its failure is most clearly seen in the neurotic subservience to infantile claims for indulgence in the transference, where 'reality-testing' and adaptation are of secondary importance to repetition and infantile pleasure-gain, just as they were subservient during the patient's illness. So the analyst abstains from playing an active rôle of protector, guide or father-imago, not only in order that the correctness of the patient's phantasies may the more easily be assayed, but in order also to force him to try for himself to

achieve his own adaptations to life and to instinctual outlet. Another reason for the analyst's non-interference in the patient's life has also a reality-basis. He *does not know* what is best for the patient, not even after the most extensive analysis. He may know what will be bad for him, he may surmise which of two may be better, but in the end the patient has to carry out the job of living for himself, and the more he relies on his own resources the better. From first to last the analyst has one goal before him, to make the patient aware of himself, not to make him aware of the good, the true or the beautiful, not God or Humanity, but only himself. If he achieves a knowledge of God or of ultimate things, that is the patient's concern, and it may possibly be to his gain—one never knows—but it cannot be a duty of his analyst's. To the analyst there are no 'germinal realities' (p. 27) but only practical ones, because the work of analysis is to relieve the patient of practical hindrances which he must be got to understand, by means which he must be got to understand. Freud's ideal is to let the patient leave the analysis understanding the seriousness of the illness from which he suffered and how he came to suffer from it, to the same extent that he (Freud) understands it. It is a joint piece of work, both being at the end equally masters of it. Jung's I gather is different: it is to lead the patient to the less definite goal of apperception of the extra-personal sources of power. On this difference I shall make two comments and then close my part of the discussion: first I regard the Jungian method as depreciative not of human personality in general but of the *particular* personality under treatment, because it divides attention between what the person brings with him and what the Jungian analyst sees or thinks he sees of God, of ultimate things, of the Collective Unconscious. If these high things are ascertainable by one mortal (the analyst) who is freed from his fixations, they are potentially ascertainable by the patient too *after* he is freed from his fixations. If these views about God and the Collective Unconscious are a myth, themselves a sign of infantile thinking and emotional fixation, to bring them into the analysis is only to perpetuate the infantile. My second comment is that the Freudian method is more precise than the Jungian in that it attempts to match present transference phenomena with past mental experiences; the Jungian on the other hand I gather attempts to match the present phenomena of transference with future mental experiences, which is far more ambitious. I regard the former as the occupation of the scientist, the latter as the prerogative of the Deity. The followers of Jung divide their interest between the actual personality of the patient under treat-

ment and the indefinite entity of the Collective Unconscious or God or whatever it may be called, and this I myself hold to be a depreciation of *human* personality. In contrast to Dr Baynes I further believe that it is the determinism of the Freudians which leads them to an *exclusive* attention to the *person* they are treating, since with this 'dogma' to guide them they have nowhere else to look but to the patient's past experiences for an explanation of the symptoms and modes of behaviour.

Finally, whether Dr Baynes is right or wrong about "new beginnings which are not historically determined," "new vibrations deeper than the personal," and the like, he will never *know* that he is right (as distinct from *believing* that he is right) without the labours of the Freudians or others with more exact methods. Freud is not infallible, but without work by his method it will not be possible to *demonstrate* that Jung is right. If such methods of verification are of no particular interest to the followers of Jung, they should unequivocally announce their viewpoint as extra-scientific, and then if they acknowledge their work to be religious they will have made a step toward definiteness for which the world will be grateful.

BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS AND MENTAL METHODS[1].

By TRIGANT BURROW.

What of it? 'Tis a figure, a symbol, say;
A thing's sign: now for the thing signified.

BROWNING.

I

Of late, certain experiences have led me to question whether the need of the mentally ill patient does not express itself in language that is totally different from that of the physician who attempts to answer it. The steady increase in the number of cases admitted annually to hospitals for the insane affords some indication of the very meagre contact that has as yet been established between the method of the psychiatrist and the disorder of the patient[2]. It is certainly true that despite our many and varying remedial recourses, the disease still continues to outrun our most desperate efforts to keep pace with it. If this wide gulf between the method and the material of science in the sphere of mental disease marks some fundamental discrepancy in our approach to these disorders; if the real difficulty, after all, is traceable to a confusion of tongues—to the absence of a common medium of interpretation between physician and patient—it will not be possible to bridge this deplorable gap in our scientific understanding until the physician is sufficiently proficient in the language of his patient to have become himself articulate in its habitual code.

[1] Paper read at the seventeenth annual meeting of the American Psychopathological Association, Cincinnati, June 3rd, 1927.

[2] According to the U.S. Government census: "There are in our hospitals for mental disorders throughout the country approximately 400,000 patients; 80,000 new patients seek their care every year." Edward N. Brush, *American Journal of Psychiatry*, January 1927, p. 602.

The late Dr Thomas W. Salmon is quoted (*Publications of the American Sociological Society*, vol. XXI, p. 87) as saying that "in New York State one person in ten who reaches adult life enters a mental hospital before he dies." (Introduction to Henry's *Essentials of Psychiatry*.)

I venture to add the conjecture that of the remaining nine who are not compelled during the course of their lives to seek institutional aid there is not one, who, though he manages to pass muster, is not during some period of his life as definitely in need of psychiatric guidance as the one out of ten who is compelled to seek such aid.

For many centuries medicine struggled ineffectually against the pandemic of tuberculosis. But all this time medical effort was directed toward treating the disorder only as it occurred in the individual here and there. It was directed toward relieving the symptoms that appeared upon the surface. Its scope was individualistic and confined to external signs. If any general measures were undertaken to prevent the increase of the disease, such measures were based in every instance upon mere symptomatic inferences. There were endless speculative recourses calculated to heal or mitigate the condition, but always it was the external symptom or appearance which during all these years occupied medical interest.

Then came the laboratory and the discovery of the specific cause. With this discovery and with the knowledge of the origin of tuberculosis and with the demonstration of the infectious nature of the disease, there were for the first time put at the service of man such measures as enabled him to wage an intelligent and effective campaign against this devastating disease-process[1].

Within the sphere of mental disease there is to-day the same ineffectual struggle. Here and there the individual is treated for his individual symptoms or, where the program is toward a wider application of remedial measures, such measures still consist in the dissemination of ideas that are equally directed toward individual symptoms and appearances. However widespread our campaigns, they are still confined to the relief of the individual and his symptoms. Restricting itself to this individualistic outlook, medicine has not yet recognized that in the mental sphere also there is equally demanded the method of the laboratory. It has not yet recognized that there is a generic cause underlying the external appearances of mental disturbance and that this underlying cause is a definitive and specific one. Lacking this basis, it is not yet a matter of general medical knowledge—far less of lay information—that mental disorders are infectious, that these conditions are transmissible from one individual to another and from generation to generation, and that the soil for their germination and spread is, like that of somatic infections, the social medium.

It cannot be said that medicine, or that civic alertness, has been at all lacking, as is attested by the active campaigns of education sponsored by the National Committee for Mental Hygiene and similar national

[1] According to statistics compiled for the years between 1904 and 1923, the deaths from tuberculosis per 100,000 population in the United States Registration Area have decreased 51 per cent.

associations. What is lacking is the recognition that the cause of nervous disorders and insanity is a definite *mental contagion* and that its control only awaits the scientific study of the minute but widespread microgenic incident responsible for it. In any other recourse we are merely beating against the air. But medicine will not reckon with the generic nature of mental dissociation until it has reckoned with the specific cause underlying it. In the absence of a specific cause there is lacking a generic pathology and the language with which we respond to our patients must necessarily remain alien to the import of the disease addressed to us. And so the obstacle to an effectual remedy for disturbed mental states would seem to be identical with the obstacle which for so many centuries stood in the way of a scientific approach to the problem of infective and other structural disease-processes, namely, that the condition resided in one sphere and the remedy was applied in another. Therapeutic method did not really confront the actual condition to be remedied. The language of the patient as represented in the physiological determinants of his disease did not meet with an adequate physiological interpretation on the side of the physician.

Let us look into the situation a little more closely. A concrete example will perhaps assist us. It used to be that the tuberculous patient consulted the doctor for what the patient called a cough, and the doctor responded by giving the patient what the doctor called a cough remedy. We know now that the disease of which the patient complained was not a cough, nor the remedy a 'cough medicine.' As the disease was not a cough, the remedy could not be found in a prescription for a cough. Obviously the difficulty here lay in the inadequacy of the older medical concept 'cough.' As the cough was the subjectively inferred and externally demonstrable symptom of the patient, it was naturally the patient's concept of his disease. And unfortunately the physician, being himself all too-humanly prone to external inference, responded with a subjective concept that was medically quite as fallacious.

Let us turn now to the mental sphere. A patient consults the psychiatrist for what the patient calls a mental disorder and the psychiatrist sets about to remedy the disorder with what the psychiatrist calls mental measures. But this interpretation, resting as it does upon a patient's concept of 'mental disorder,' rests upon no sounder scientific basis than the concept of the patient who interprets tuberculosis in terms of his or her symptom or concept 'cough.' It is true that the patient's condition registers itself in subjective sensations that are felt or symptomatized as mental pain or conflict. But what does the patient know of the

functional nature of his intrinsic disturbance? He calls it 'mental,' but 'mental,' like 'cough,' is only the patient's subjective concept as inferred from his habitual sensations or from his subjective tendency of interpretation. So that here again the physician has fallen a too ready prey to the patient's merely subjective and uncritical inference as to the nature of his disturbance. Like his earlier colleague in respect to tuberculosis, he is attracted to the superficial reaction that presents only a subjective appearance of disease and he quite misses the real focus of infection embodying the disease in its objective physiological actuality.

In the somatic sphere the Darwinian principle of an evolutionary biology has demanded that we replace our habitually individualistic and symptomatological inferences with a scientific method based upon a principle of interpretation that is structural and phyletic. With Darwin there was introduced the inclusive method of the laboratory that precluded for ever the tendency of inference characteristic of the subjective or individualistic habit of interpretation. By virtue of this biological principle, the symptomatic or apparent meaning was discarded by medical science and there arose instead the laboratories of Pasteur and of Koch with their investigations resting no longer upon the varying aspects of outer sign and semblance in this or that individual but upon a broad anatomical and histological analysis of the tissues that compose the species as a whole. With this broad background as a basis, the discovery of the specific and universal cause of disease-process depended upon an analysis of the biological structures constituting the universal seat of the bacteria in question.

A modest attempt to substitute a laboratory basis of observation in the sphere of our individual and social reactions, comparable to that existing in the sphere of medicine and biology elsewhere, has been made through studies of the reactions of groups of students with whom I have worked in association for some six years[1]. These researches have led me to the conclusion that the concept of 'mental' disorder in its present individualistic and symptomatic content is, throughout, a biological misnomer and that all therapeutic procedure based upon it is necessarily erroneous[2]. I am convinced that, as a clinical description of disease, the

[1] By the method of the laboratory I mean the method which recognizes that the individualistic approach is necessarily but the symptomatological approach and which replaces this isolated and merely conceptual or symptomatic basis of interpretation with a method of investigation that is distinguished as biological and phyletic.

[2] The concept 'mental disorder' really represents in itself a substitutive mechanism socially that is the counterpart of the very substitutive mechanism which, as psychiatrists, we are supposedly studying in the individual. But the interest of the psychiatrist in a

concept 'mental' is scientifically no more valid than the concept 'cough' is scientifically valid as a connotation for tuberculosis.

The result of observations of individuals in groups[1] has brought to light the existence of inter-reactions among them which, though greatly distorted in their natural physiological expression due to the stress of civilization, possess primarily a function that is racial and unitary. Notwithstanding the tendency to distort and to disavow these common reactions, there was constantly observable this physiological unanimity of reaction that naturally characterizes the concerted function of the individual elements composing the group or unit. This finding is especially interesting in its subjective corroboration of the principle of racial solidarity first posited by Darwin—a solidarity dependent upon an instinctive co-ordination or integration in the reactions of the individuals of a species toward a common unitary function. It was upon this instinctive group integration, you may recall, that Darwin largely based his principle of the survival of the fittest and not alone, as has been generally thought, upon the special equipment of the individual[2].

It would appear that civilized man, in abrogating these physiological inter-reactions instinctive to the race, is compelled to compensate artificially for the loss of his integrative function as a racial unit in quite abortive, self-limited reactions. These substitutive reactions can only issue in unproductive concepts or social images[3]. Accordingly there have developed among us as a race all manner of pseudo-physiological reactions due to the unnatural conversion of primary race functions into autonomous acquisitions and isolated satisfactions. The result is that abnormal satisfactions or autohedonisms, if I may coin such a use, have replaced those primary instinctive satisfactions that belong to man as a racial unit.

In view of these wider implications of our human pathology, I think the time has come when we should take a position of observation with respect to nervous disorders and insanity that is further removed from our present individualistic angle of evaluation. It seems to me we have

mental prolapse that is socially co-extensive with the prolapse of mentation he himself attempts to study in the individual patient is a circumstance which may only be met as the individual psychiatrist applies the laboratory basis of inquiry to his own processes.

[1] "The Laboratory Method in Psycho-analysis, Its Inception and Development." *American Journal of Psychiatry*, vol. v, No. 3, January 1926.

[2] "Those communities which included the greatest number of the most sympathetic members would flourish best, and rear the greatest number of offspring" (*The Descent of Man*, 2nd ed., p. 163). See also P. Propotkin's *Mutual Aid*: A. A. Knopf.

[3] "Social Images *versus* Reality." *The Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology*, vol. XIX, No. 3, October–December 1924.

need to recognize that what we are wont in our nosological habit of interpretation to call mental symptoms are actually observable distortions of physiological inter-reactions. There is the need to view these disorders from a racial basis of interpretation and to regard the dissociated individual as a disintegrated element in relation to a racially co-ordinated unit[1].

It is my thesis that a nervous disorder represents in truth a physiological disorder due to the separation of the individual from his place as a functioning part of the species as a whole. If this is true, it is useless to attempt to relieve such a physiological distortion in the absence of such physiological measures of repair as would restore the individual to his natural racial co-ordination. Detached mental measures that attempt to deal with the individual as a discrete entity will not avail. As well attempt to remove an individual cell from an organ, or an organ from the body as a whole, and bid it function healthily! A remedy that will afford a sound basis for the physiologically dissociated individual is an approach that will restore the organism's physiological integrity of function through re-establishing its balanced relation to other organisms with which it is biologically identical.

It is definitely my position that the *instinctive* reactions occurring among individuals in response to tactile, visual, olfactory and auditory sense stimuli, together with the instinctive reactions of sex, are as truly physiological inter-reactions, from the standpoint of the functional continuity they mediate between individuals, as the inter-reactions occurring within the organism of the single individual, based as they are upon the functional continuity between the elements composing it. A physiological basis of interpretation, however, demands concrete physiological evidence. A thesis that is physiological must demonstrate the physiological structures upon which it rests. If it is true that the disorder we have been calling mental is really physiological, a scientific demonstration must show definitely wherein the physiological or functional impairment consists. It is precisely such a concrete demonstration which it is the function of group analysis to present. But in attempting to assemble the data requisite to a concrete physiological basis of inquiry, it is required that my readers shall also assume, for the time being, a group or racial basis of analysis. It is only upon such a common group basis that we may reach a concrete physiological status of evaluation.

[1] *The Social Basis of Consciousness*, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., Ltd., London; Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York.

II

I think it will be conceded that nervous disorders and insanity are predominantly diseases of civilization; that they are concomitant to a heightening of the complexities of living and to the exacting differentiations incident to modern adaptations. It would be interesting to consider just what specific alterations have taken place in the habitual relations of individuals to one another. It would be interesting to consider the physiological adjustments in the life of man socially in consequence of the changes attendant upon a more complex mode of life. To this end we shall be helped, I think, through a somewhat closer view of our customary social images and through an analysis of the primary elements of their inception.

Beginning with the earliest process whereby the child is inducted into the mental and social guild that is to form the background of his ultimate adaptation, we find that the very first step in the training of the child consists in bringing him face to face with a voluntary choice between sinister alternatives. On one side of him there is drawn up a detailed and ever-increasing list of reactions that are called commendable and through which he will win for himself the social approval; and on the other side, an equally elaborate category of reactions that are prohibited and so threaten him with the disapproval of the social milieu. Now I think it may be shown that there is involved here a definite physiological process and it is this process and the subsequent modifications it entails within the organism, individually and socially, that I shall ask you to consider with me.

As we are all aware, among primates as among mammalian orders generally, the reactions of the individual are governed by two roughly parallel central nervous systems—the one cerebrospinal, controlling the voluntary reactions of the organism; and the other the sympathetic, controlling the organism's vegetative and instinctive reactions. In response, however, to the moralistic alternative of 'right and wrong' and to the consequent social image in which man's social behaviour is reflected, the burden of the individual's adaptation to his fellows is thrown predominantly upon the cerebrospinal or voluntary system. So that through the mental opinion or social picture of himself which he acquires socially and through which he must adjust his outward conduct, the individual is incited to employ only the cerebrospinal division of his adaptive equipment. For example, with his eye or ear (cerebrospinal end-organs) he becomes aware of a tactile or vocal gesture (cerebrospinal

reaction) as it relates to the social opinion or behaviour about him (again a cerebrospinal reaction). Clearly this relates the individual to himself and to others upon an exclusively cerebrospinal plane of adaptation. Periphery is, as it were, contacted with periphery—voluntary perceptual sense with voluntary sensational reaction. Accordingly, this application of periphery to periphery establishes a quite artificial arc or conduit along which no sympathetic or involuntary visceral response is permitted to pass.

Our mental and social images, then, as they affect the behaviour of the organism, involve physiological reactions that are incomplete and abortive. The superficial plane to which these adaptive reflexes are confined, artificially restricts the organism's natural physiological response. This physiological restriction of natural neural currents affects not only the reactions of the individual as they pertain to his own organism but, in this abortive physiological reaction, there occurs a situation which affects the social organism of man as a whole. For it is not alone the surface of the single individual that is restricted to this voluntary peripheral path of discharge—not only in the individual does periphery contact with periphery—but, owing to the social character of the responses entailed, the periphery or voluntary system of each individual is brought into a peripheral or 'voluntary' relationship with every other individual. That is, the image or percept of one individual (cerebrospinal stimulus) causes a response in the external behaviour of another individual (cerebrospinal reaction). In short, as social images are entirely peripheral they produce an entirely social and peripheral response.

Of the instinctive reactions belonging to the sympathetic or involuntary nervous system, the two that are most important in mediating man's external adaptation are the nutritive and the sex instincts; the one affecting the life and growth of the individual organism, the other the life and growth of the race as a whole. In the absence, however, of the natural physiological accord between the vegetative and the peripheral nervous systems, the individual's nutritive reactions are quite markedly distorted. In his driving compulsion toward the advantageous alternative, in his desire to acquire for himself what is good and commendable and add to his category of the socially desirable, the individual perceives through the peripheral or external sense organ—let us say, of the eye or of the olfactory sense—a certain complex, highly seasoned article of food, such, for example, as the delectable 'banana royal.' Under this stimulus the external or peripheral sense organs represented in the taste-buds of the tongue derive a 'good' or advantageous sensation from contact with

this highly stimulating confection. Too frequently, though, the nutritive value of such foods is negligible or certainly quite secondary. Their chief value consists merely in that they 'taste good.' And so one need not consult alone the dietary tables of the chemists to realize to what extent the very general condition of digestive disorders among communities of civilized man results from the interpolation of this vicarious arc in place of the physiological arc naturally uniting periphery and centre, perception and instinct in the sphere of man's nutritional needs.

Nor need we refer to the expert dietician for an explanation of the physical disfigurements that characterize the gastric and abdominal zones of the average middle-aged man or woman. It is obvious that a persistent and exaggerated lust for the sensations of taste on the basis of its mere peripheral delectability, without regard to the internal promptings of the sympathetic or visceral instinct of hunger, causes a constant overloading of the stomach and intestines that must ultimately cause disease or impairment either to these organs or to organs functionally related to them.

In the sphere of man's sexual instinct, the situation is even more serious. It is more serious because the physiological discontinuity between periphery and centre, perception and instinct, as it occurs in this sphere, affects not only the individual organism but the social organism as well. *For the sex instinct depends for the completion of its natural function not only upon the physiological continuity of the individual organism in its balanced co-ordination of cerebrospinal and sympathetic systems, but also upon the physiological continuity between the organism of one individual and another as mediated through the balanced co-ordination of these two systems within each.*

Corresponding to the situation described in respect to the nutritional sphere, there also occurs in respect to the individual's sexual sphere his quite externally perceived sensation of something 'good' or desirable to be peripherally obtained in the zone of the external genitals. He learns to look at and to stimulate or to have stimulated this part of his surface and to derive a pleasurable response from so doing. There thus occurs a quite distorted reaction physiologically by reason of the peripheral arc artificially established between the voluntary perception of or attention upon the external reproductive organs and their peripheral stimulation. Herein lies the physiological incitement to the abortive act of manustupration in which the hand, through contact with the sex organs, establishes through the cerebrospinal arc a quite superficially actuated excitation and response. Herein lies also the habitual incitement to sexual intercourse as it widely exists to-day under the popular acceptation of 'normal.'

Because of this peripheral short-circuiting of natural physiological function, the internal instinctive motivation to sex is only secondarily operative. Further, with the establishment of this peripheral arc in substitution for the complete and natural innervation of the individual's sex life, this neural pattern is carried over into the social sphere and the individual's contact with others sexually remains upon an equally peripheral, narcissistic plane. What is a peripheral, cerebrospinal mode of release within the organism of the individual becomes a cerebrospinal, peripheral mode of release in relation to another organism. A peripheral and narcissistic level of sex excitation in the individual is reciprocated upon a level that is equally narcissistic and peripheral socially. Due, therefore, to this peripheral displacement, the reactions of individuals sexually are no more completely organic or physiological than are their reactions nutritively.

III

In his analysis of individuals, Freud has clearly demonstrated the invariable concomitance between nervous manifestations and disorders of the sex life, and certainly this finding in regard to neurotic patients has been fully corroborated by my own analyses and by those of other analysts. What seems to me scientifically required of us now is the discovery of a principle that will resolve our individual findings into a satisfactory synthesis through demonstrating the specific biological cause that underlies this undoubted concomitance. According to our group basis of investigation, this generic cause resides in the physiological distortion due to the stimulus of the organism through artificial social and peripheral images. It resides in the obstruction of the channels of transmission belonging to the instinctive vegetative system and in the consequent disproportionate stress that is thrown upon the cerebrospinal system of reactions with its artificial interpolation of peripheral paths of response.

It is our group position that, compared with the normal, the neurotic reaction represents only an exaggerated response within the individual to this artificial substitution throughout society of social images and peripheral excitations in place of a spontaneous physiological response to organic stimuli. It is our thesis that the neurosis is physiological, that social images with their external moralistic standards and peripheral adaptations are based upon a physiological miscarriage of feeling and instinct, and that this is due to a cleavage or discontinuity between the two major nervous systems governing the organism of man. If this is

true, no amount of mental therapy or peripheral perceptions, based as they also are upon social images, will avail to restore the breach in the feeling-life of man due to this physiological cleavage.

Do not suppose that in the physiological interpretation of insanity here invoked I am reverting for a moment to theories of the neuro-musculature or to the endocrines. Not at all. The physiological inter-reactionism here posited in no way touches the issue for or against the theory of structuralism. Neither am I repudiating for a moment the actuality underlying the phenomena we commonly call 'mental.' On the contrary, it is precisely to give greater emphasis to the actuality of these phenomena that I am discounting the habitual detachment of our 'mental' interpretation of them. It is my essential position that what we call mental is itself physiological when viewed in a social or phyletic as well as in an individual or ontogenetic sense, and that only in the measure in which we employ a principle and a technique of interpretation that is physiological shall we bring the reactions we now interpret in images or in mental concepts under the direct observation and control of scientific laboratory procedure[1].

Nor must the physiological position here advanced be confused—however great is the temptation to do so—with the conceptual premise

[1] What is needed is that the mental sciences should recognize their close affiliation with ecclesiastical precepts. I do not think it begins to be realized how much of that which is called psychiatry, psychology, psycho-analysis and the psychic sphere generally is directly traceable to scholastic influence. Paul, St Francis Xavier, Thomas à Kempis are the patron saints of psychiatry. As the study of consciousness is inextricably bound up with theological traditions, psychology and the Church would seem congenitally incapable of divorcing one another. The reason is to be found in the close kinship between the two spheres and in the quite doctrinary assumptions uniting their mutual prepossessions. Accordingly, I think we shall come to see that religion, and not science, is the sire of our so-called mental sciences. If this is true, it is vitally important that we strike out, once and for all, the inseparable religious connotations that cling to our entire psychic constellation and get directly down at last to the immediate actuality of our physiological reactions both individual and social.

An aspect of group analysis offering an interesting sociological survey would be precisely a study of the relationship between our schools of psychotherapy and the mental reactions underlying our various religious creeds. We might profitably compile statistical figures in this connection. Physicians belonging to our various psychotherapeutic schools would doubtless be surprized to find how directly their psychological persuasions trace their descent from corresponding ecclesiastical principles. They would be surprized to learn to what extent our schools of philosophy, psychology and of psychopathology are but reflections of the varying aspects of 'belief' represented in Calvin, Luther, John Knox and the Popes! In psycho-analytic gatherings I have more than once listened to affecting exhortations "to remember our *Credo*." As if a scientific gathering could possibly reconcile itself to the superstitious fealty of 'Credos'! And yet, until there is the adoption of the

of the Behaviourists. The Behaviourists are to be commended on many grounds, but least of all on the ground of their behaviour—their actual physiological behaviour[1]. In a sense, I suppose, our group principle and its basic *actionism* is, in tendency, closely akin to the tendency of behaviourism. But the principle of the inter-reactions of human beings as applied to their group function has the merit of embodying a physiological mood- or feeling-basis that actually functions in accordance with the actionistic canons of man's racial physiology. It does not merely formulate theories in accordance with an individualistic and canonical concept of it.

It is a far cry from the human theory of animal behaviourism to the animal behaviour that is human. Animal behaviour is internal, physiological, involuntary. But the behaviourism of psychologist or philosopher is but a social image involving a peripheral response to a peripheral excitation. Being cerebrospinal, voluntary, peripheral, the behaviourism it implies lacks the spontaneity of an organic, physiological inter-reaction. Under the physiological conditions of group analysis, hypotheses of conduct or of human action are seen to be substitutions for action itself. They are seen as replacements for the organic function which they are content merely to explain and for which, in so doing, they must necessarily represent but an image or theory. From the functionalistic or group basis of observation, this mechanism, that substitutes in place of an organic system of functions an elaborate system of images in 'explanation' of function, is found to be identical with the mechanism that underlies the neurotic's replacement of images for reality in his explanation of

evolutionary basis of analysis required by the generic group method of investigation, we can only share in the solemn Amen commonly expressed in the unanimous acceptance of such devout invocations.

But psychotherapy need not feel abashed at having to acknowledge its unconscious affinity with the Episcopate. The only occasion for diffidence is the absence of such acknowledgment. After all, we need only to remember that the sciences of chemistry and astronomy are also the outgrowths of such pitiful sciolisms as alchemy and astrology, and that medicine itself was once represented by the arts of magician and fakir.

[1] Obviously the theory of behaviourism must in this very process of the Behaviourist contradict behaviourism. For in this conscious reasoning of the Behaviourist (rationalization from the standpoint of group analysis), there is the very essence of the social or peripheral image. Surely it is manifest that such a process is but a concept of 'behaviourism.' It is not physiological reaction, it is a theory of physiological reaction. And my point is that no concept of behaviourism or of actuality will ever approach actuality or behaviour. It must remain but a psychological concept in the absence of the physiological actuality of man's functional inter-reaction as an organic race unit. As a theory of living processes and of their inter-reaction, behaviourism is as sound a theory as any we have yet reached. But man, the theorist, is himself a living process and his *theory* of himself—his mental projection of his own inter-reactions—in no way touches himself. It touches only his image of himself.

'himself.' The one represents the social or collective reaction of which the other is but the single and the isolated counterpart[1].

It will be found that wherever psychology approaches a scientific basis, it approaches a physiological basis. When we have sufficiently recovered from theories of the neuroses, or of abnormal behaviour, to permit ourselves to assume a physiological basis of observation toward the vicarious images of which our theories of living processes are constructed, we shall find that these constructions represent as spurious a basis socially as the isolated type of image-formation we have learned to recognize individually in the clinic. It remains for the student of human conduct to adopt a phyletic basis of observation such as will include the immediate function of the student as well, and thus absorb in reactions themselves what must otherwise be but a projected image or theory of reactions.

IV

We return to the physiological basis that is social—to the functional inter-reactions of individuals as elements in a biologically unitary species and to the disturbance of these inter-reactions through the substitution socially of images for reality—a mechanism which, in its social implications, is identical with the individual transpositions of affect first noted by Freud through his observation of hysterical patients[2]. In this physiological interpretation of our human relationships, we are put in the way to understand the quite peripheral character of man's adaptation in his mating life. We are enabled to understand the distortion that exists socially in the sphere of sex due to the absence of those organic elements that contribute to the natural expression of the reproductive impulse. We begin to find the physiological explanation for the great increase of unhappy marriages with their futile recourse to divorce—futile, because until there is the scientific recognition of their physiological basis, these miscarriages of the mating instinct can only lead to a change of partners that is prompted by an equally peripheral and narcissistic impulse.

[1] This circumstance of the transcendence of social images in substitution for the inter-reactive functioning of the organism of man as a race explains why 'psychology' is so popular a science. Psychology is popular for the same reason that religion or the psychosis is popular; because it rests, as these do, upon the arbitrarily mutable image that is sponsored alone by the wish-fulfilment of the individual as a separate social element. It explains the enormous vogue psychology enjoys not only in the consultation room or lecture hall but in the animated discourse of afternoon teas. And why not? For surely, upon a 'psychological' or image basis, one individual's theories or images are as good as another's!

[2] *Studien über Hysterie.* Sigmund Freud, 1910, 2nd ed. Deuticke: Vienna.

We begin to understand something of the increasing introversion and pathology of childhood and to draw somewhat closer to the intolerable conflict of youth with its recourse either to sudden suicide or to the more protracted nepenthe of alcoholism. Individually and socially their situation is insupportable. They must find some temporary abatement of it. Alcohol has been found to work. It at least releases the inhibitions of their socially tutored and overworked voluntary nervous system. And in mitigating for a moment the lack of balanced co-ordination that alone insures a healthy and complete adaptation to reality, this temporary expedient at least palliates in some measure, however artificially, the physiological conflict that now exists between the inner and outer sphere of their organic life.

How commonly the young seek to salvage their condition in the imaginative flights of sheer phantasy is a circumstance we commemorate under such popular insignia as 'youth's insanity' or 'dementia praecox.' In such compensations we find the peripheral system wholly renounced except as it serves the distortions of function we see mediated in auto-erotic sensations. The periphery, as contactor or receptor in relation to a world of external social impressions, is now no longer operative. But the entire organism, withdrawing 'into itself,' regresses more and more toward the circumscribed functions activated by the sympathetic system and thus sinks deeper and deeper into those physiological moods and phantasies which have their substrate in this primal instinctive sphere. For wherever there exists peripherally a system of dissociated image-concepts, there can only exist centrally a system of dissociated image-moods[1].

We are brought back, then, to the question of an agreement of language, of a common medium of interchange or understanding between the expressions of our patients as represented in their symptoms on the one hand and our own response as represented in our conceptual or mental approach to their alleviation on the other. It is obvious that a disorder due to a peripheral or pseudo-physiological habit of social adaptation cannot be altered by an approach which, in its own social involvement, is not less peripheral or pseudo-physiological in its adaptation. It is obvious that social images are unavailing as a remedy for a condition that embodies a physiological maladjustment. Mental and

[1] As in my book, *The Social Basis of Consciousness*, I made a discrimination between 'sexuality' and 'sex,' so I also discriminate between the interchanges among us that are social and those organic bonds within the race I call societal. The reader is asked to keep this distinction in mind in the present paper.

social concepts are not an answer to inherent physiological needs. In such an approach there is lacking a common medium. The language of the physician does not respond to the disorder of the patient.

In conclusion let me repeat that conditions that are biological and universal in the organic sphere are biological and universal in the functional sphere. Images that are social are universal. They are yours and mine as well as the patient's. As psychopathologists, our only recourse is the recognition of our own tendency to peripheral social images in substitution for the organism's integral sensations and reactions. Only in our own physiological integrity and health may we reach and understand internally, 'sympathetically,' those mood disorders that are due to a peripheral distortion of the instinct of sex characteristic of the condition of our patients.

There is required, then, a technique for re-establishing man's natural physiological inter-reactions. As these inter-reactions are internal to the organism, their establishment must begin with our own internal approach to them. If the language expressed in the disturbed condition of our patients represents an inarticulate need which, in truth, is seeking to express itself in physiologically integrated reactions, we shall respond to their need only as our own language becomes articulate through a technique that re-establishes this same physiologically disturbed balance within ourselves. As we repudiate our own social and peripheral images and excitations and thus allow our own physiological inter-reactions, individual and social, to function integratively and naturally, we shall afford our patients the requisite medium for understanding and re-establishing their own.

CRITICAL NOTICE.

An Outline of Abnormal Psychology. By WILLIAM MCDOUGALL, F.R.S. Methuen & Co., Ltd. Pp. 572. Price 15*s.* net.

This book of Professor McDougall's should be read in connection with his earlier one, *An Outline of Psychology.* McDougall is an out and out supporter, and indeed the leading exponent, of the "hormic" view of psychology, which regards the mind as essentially dynamic, and conative action as its most characteristic function. This view is in direct opposition to the older mechanist view of the mind as "built up" of sensations, etc., and to the hedonist principle which regards pleasure as the mind's chief motive. In this work McDougall applies the principle of dynamic psychology to the elucidation of the psychoneuroses.

McDougall's experience in the realm of psychological experiment, his first-hand anthropological study of the primitive savage, and his experience in psychopathology, entitles him to a respect for his views which cannot be claimed by those of us whose experience has been confined to one or other of these spheres. In this book he attempts to bring together the results of systematic and normal psychology, with the important discoveries in psychopathology made by many investigators, and most notably by Freud, with whom he disagrees in many points of theory, but to whom he pays the handsome tribute, "I believe that Professor Freud has done more for the advancement of Psychology than any other student since Aristotle."

For his clinical material, McDougall depends mostly on war cases. If there is weakness anywhere in the book it appears to be here. These cases, as Professor McDougall says, present the problems of psychopathology in their simplest form, and those who had the treatment of numbers of cases of "shell shock" have a singular advantage over those who have not had the opportunity of such clinical material. The circumstances of the onset of these disorders comes as near to giving us the conditions of laboratory experiment as we are ever likely to get in psychopathology, and their treatment and cure were of the simplest. But although they were not essentially different from civilian cases in pathology, they were different in that it is the *immediate* factor in "shell shock," whereas it is the predisposing factor in most civilian cases, that is the most important causative factor. The fact that all that was required in these cases was to readjust the patient to the immediate traumatic causes, has tempted some to look for the only cause of the civilian cases also in some such comparatively recent experience.

Sex perversion. Thus McDougall in the treatment of the Sex Perversions speaks of a case of cutting off the "pigtail" of a girl as being due to the fact that "as a boy he sat in school behind a girl whose hair fell down in a queue, which hair he used to contemplate while another boy talked to him in a way which excited him sexually." The question naturally arises why *this* boy contemplating the hair, developed such a fetichism, whereas the others presumably became normal sexually. Surely the answer is that there were predisposing causes and complexes in his case which were aroused into activity

by this experience, whereas the absence of these in the others had no other effect than the arousal of their normal sex instincts. To parallel such a case—a man had a fetichism for corduroy which arose from his having sexual excitement when riding on the back of a big boy at school whose coat was of corduroy. We might have been tempted to accept this as the sole cause. But besides this, the corduroy with its soft smooth feel aroused the sensuous feeling of his mother's breast. Both factors played a part, and the predisposing factor was as important as the other. It is this infantile factor which gives to the fetichism its arrested character and prevents the stimulation of the sex instincts in the later incident from pursuing its normal course.

We therefore cannot help feeling that McDougall's explanation of the sex perversions is *too* simple. They seem, to judge from the cases quoted, to depend upon incidents in which sexual experiences are associated with specific circumstances, and so give rise to the abnormality. In this connection McDougall quotes freely from Dr Healy of Boston whose remarkable work in connection with delinquents is so well known. It is not necessary to deny the immense therapeutic value of such work as Healy's to criticize the assumption that the exciting cause does not explain the whole condition. The perversions are very complex and many of them are clearly a persistence of infantile sensuous (without necessarily being sexual) activities. It is disorder in these predisposing elements which makes the precipitation of the later perversions possible. McDougall deprecates the "dragging in of the Oedipus Complex and theories of infantile sexuality" (pp. 324–5). These theories, as enunciated by the psycho-analysts, may or may not be true, and they are, after all, theories. But if the sex perversions are as simple as McDougall asserts, the surprising thing about them is that any of us escape. We agree with McDougall that sadism and masochism find their roots in the non-sexual instincts of assertion and submission. Is it not probable that the *other* sex perversions also find their roots in instinctive activities, possibly non-sexual in their origin, which become linked on with the sex instinct and that they are not *merely* the result of chance association, as in so many of Healy's cases?

Repression. The question of repression is one that has always held an important place in psychopathology, and McDougall devotes much attention to it. The question, what is the nature of repression, what is the repressing force, and what it is that is repressed and why, are questions that are not altogether solved even now.

As regards the repressing force, McDougall agrees with Freud in regarding it as an affective force of the personality—as in Freud the "Super Ego." There is, however, another important form of repression to which neither Freud nor McDougall gives due emphasis, that in which there is the simple expulsion of one primitive impulsive tendency by another. This kind of repression is not the work of the ego as such; but one affective tendency, say a craving for protective love is turned to jealousy and furious hate, and this new state of hatred completely obliterates and utterly represses the former craving for love. This kind of repression of one elemental tendency by another is very common. Moreover, it can take place in infancy, say at the time of weaning, before the ego, as such, is organized.

There are still however many unsolved problems ranging round the subject of repression. Can we speak of affective tendencies (like the libido) being repressed at all when the very existence of the psychoneurosis is evidence that it has *not* been repressed? If this is so, the essential feature of the psycho-

neurosis is not repression but diversion. Again, McDougall does not make it very clear what it is that *is* repressed. To the Freudian it is the libido. Does McDougall hold that the repression and dissociation of *any* of the instincts—curiosity, assertion, sex, or parental—are capable of producing psychoneuroses, or does he mean that unacceptable *experiences* rather than affective conditions are repressed and dissociated? We should, in other words, have liked McDougall to have related this book more than he has to his work on Social Psychology. And again, does he hold to his "Drainage" theory in the Psychoneuroses, and if so, is not this in opposition to the idea of "repression," since all we need to assume is that what is "repressed" is only what has been inhibited by drainage, not actively excluded?

McDougall makes at least two suggestions of great importance with regard to repression—one is the difference between repression and dissociation; the other that dissociation does not play any part in obsessions.

McDougall puts very neatly the relation between conflict, repression and dissociation. "Conflict and repression prepare the way for, and may produce dissociation. Dissociation terminates conflict, but repression in itself does not. It merely obscures the conflict from consciousness, preventing the motives of the one part from gaining normal and direct expression in consciousness."

McDougall also makes a good point when he maintains that repression, "far from being accomplished once for all, is a continuing activity, which manifests itself in experiences such as dreams. This he explains in terms of dynamic psychology by the principle that conative energy, once directed towards a particular goal continues to work towards it subconsciously as long as the goal is not attained." The goal in repression is "the banishment of the unacceptable from consciousness," and thus repression itself may be an unconscious process.

Whilst distinguishing Repression and Dissociation, McDougall, however, recognises the relation between the two. Dissociation is often prepared for by repression. An active repression may maintain the dissociation.

As regards the psychoneuroses, he says, "Dissociation is the process characteristic of what are called hysterical disorders: as conflict and repression, without dissociation, characterise disorders of the neurasthenic type" (p. 252).

(P. 220.) "The conflict continues subconsciously and then is still distressing and exhausting to the patient. His energies are consumed....He is restless and depressed, sleeps poorly, cannot concentrate his attention, commonly suffers from headache...weakness of the eyes...pains." These make up the picture of a neurasthenic condition.

In defence of the first theory, as to the distinction between Repression and Dissociation, he quotes the case of Irene—a typical case of dissociation—and denies that *repression* is present because (*a*) the patient has lost all memory of the incident, (*b*) there is no continuing conflict, no distress, (*c*) the dissociated condition does not affect the judgment or appear in dreams or phantasies. Thus he says that dissociation and repression are distinct as processes and as states. That there are various states and degrees of Repression probably few would deny. But it seems more probable that Dissociation is merely the result of a more exaggerated Repression. In reply to the first point, surely it is part of Freud's conception of Repression (and we presume McDougall uses the term in the technical sense now fixed by usage) that it is forgotten. As to the second point, there is no manifest conflict because the two motives no longer fight for expression at the same time but compromise by "taking turns": and

thirdly—the reason why repressed conditions appear in dreams and phantasies is because they are not given adequate expression in life, whereas in this case of Irene the dissociated part finds ample expression in the alternative state.

We agree with McDougall that there are two states, that in which the conflict is still restive and that in which the dissociation is *un fait accompli*—but nothing he says goes to prove that *both* of these are not the result of repression. McDougall's distinction between these two seems to prepare the way for the neuronic view of dissociation—"the efferent rush of freed energy or neurokyme through the one neurone system withdraws the neurokyme from all its collaterals as a rush of water down a main pipe sucks into its current water from collateral pipes." Most of such dissociations are produced by emotional shock. We agree with the writer that the physiological mechanism of such conditions must be considered, but there seems to us to be no reason to deny that dissociation may be of a purely repressive and psychological type, which indeed is the case in dissociation produced by hypnosis. If we can forget by repression an unpalatable incident, why should we not completely forget a whole group of mental experiences, tantamount to a dissociation? Many cases of dissociation, such as hysterical conditions, can be cured by proving to the patient that he *can* move his fingers, stand straight, etc. This is true, but it does not rule out the possibility of repression. A repressed complex, such as is associated with a war experience, may produce such a condition, and then, as it weakens or loses its affect because of the condition of peace, it fails to maintain the dissociation with any strength, and therefore a convincing demonstration of the possibility of movement of the limb is enough to tip the balance. But that the dissociation was feebly maintained does not exclude the possibility of repression playing a dominant rôle both in its onset and in its maintenance. If we analyse out a "shell shock" patient we find that there was no such sudden break as a superficial view of such a case suggests, but that there is a continuation of conscious thoughts throughout, even when the man is being blown up in the air, and all of which he can recall under hypnosis or in free association.

In brief, we feel that McDougall gives to the term Repression a somewhat narrowed meaning; and we suggest that the word should be used to represent a *process*, whereas dissociation represents a resultant fact, usually the result of exaggerated repression.

Automatism. One of the most interesting parts of the book is devoted to the subjects of automatism (fugue, somnambulism), cases of alternating personalities, co-conscious personalities and dual personality—subjects which have recently tended to fall in abeyance.

Janet, we may remember, distinguishes fugues from somnambulisms in that they are less isolated and intense, are not real hallucinations, and last much longer. McDougall distinguishes fugue from somnambulism in that it expresses a larger part of the whole personality. But we cannot find that he distinguishes 'fugue' from "dual personality" in any systematic way. The word 'fugue' signifies 'flight,' which characterises most of these cases. But this is a mere description of a characteristic symptom and not a term describing a psychopathological entity. The two conditions, in fact, have not been systematically differentiated. If we regard "dissociation and reciprocal amnesia" as characteristic of dual personality, we should have to include 'fugues' as one form of dual personality for they correspond with this description. If

we are to retain the term 'fugue' to describe a psychopathological entity, we must find in it some characteristic distinguishing it from dual personality and at the same time more fundamental than the incidental one of 'flight.'

As there are then two classes, one would suggest that the term "dual personality" should be used of those in which the *character* changes, and the term 'fugue' for those cases in which the character remains essentially the same, but in which it operates in a *different environment,* real or imaginary, in response to some hidden craving. Such classification would distinguish these two well-known types and also put the term 'fugue' on a more satisfactory basis than that of mere *physical* flight. We may, of course, have cases in which both fugue and dual personality are combined.

A typical case of dual personality is that of Félida who in one state is gay, in another is morose, remembering her morose condition when she is gay, but forgetting her gaiety when she is morose. In the fugue the change of environment may be imaginary, as when an ex-officer goes to Chelmsford in 1920 and thinks himself in Peronne during the war, behaving with the same character, just as he would have done in Peronne. His character is not changed, he holds the same individuality in both cases, but he operates in a different (in this case imaginary) environment. In other cases, the typical fugue, the *actual* environment is different—the patient disappears from London and finds himself in Cork—but otherwise there is nothing particularly noticeable about his conduct. "The police," as Charcot said, "don't stop them."

In support of this distinction we would point to the fact that in none of the cases cited as 'fugues' (Cases 11 and 12—p. 258) is any change of character recorded, whilst in every case cited as alternating personalities (Cases 45–55—pp. 483–489), as well as in the cases of co-conscious personalities (Cases 56–59), such a marked change in character is recorded as the most striking feature of the condition.

Theories of Cure. McDougall describes and criticizes at some length the subject of abreaction. Abreaction as a regular method of treatment declined with the passing of the traumatic view of the psychoneuroses. But the relation of emotional expression to the cure of a patient remains an important question, and it has appeared again in the Freudian theory of Transference, in which the 'affect' is liberated and directed towards the physician. The theory of catharsis or abreaction was that the bringing up of the emotion was essentially a *causative* factor in the cure, although both Freud and those who follow him in this theory maintain also the necessity of *re-association.* McDougall seems to hold, on the contrary, that the emotional element is a *consequence* not a cause of the changed attitude, that it is not the discharge of the emotion but the ending of the dissociation which cures, although he admits that the emotional experience may facilitate this end. That the discharge of the emotion is insufficient to bring about the cure is proved by the constant recurrence of 'fits,' as well as by experiments like the following: The present writer treating a "shell shock" case, obtained under hypnosis an emotional revival of a traumatic experience which brought on the disorder, a severe head shake, but without recalling it to his waking consciousness. There was, however, no appreciable change in his condition. The patient was then hypnotized, but without reproducing the emotion, and was told that he would on waking remember what had been recalled in hypnosis. This he did, and in 24 hours his head shake had completely disappeared and had not returned when I heard of him two years after. The emotional discharge and the relief of the dissocia-

tion thus took place in two distinct stages. This proved that the release of the emotional element alone was not sufficient, whereas the reassociation of the event in consciousness was, and in the case seems to give support to McDougall's views. We are inclined then to agree with McDougall in this view. If, however, we regard the matter *developmentally*, we arrive at a more satisfactory explanation of the process of cure for, after all, it is not explained why reassociation *as such* should cure. According to this view we have certain tendencies within us aggressive tendencies or love tendencies—which, if given scope, develop into higher forms. If they are *not* given a proper atmosphere in childhood but are strangulated and repressed, they do not develop, and thus appear in later life as morbid activities. By changing that in the personality (*e.g.* false ego-ideal) which denies them expression, we liberate them, and they then go through the normal stages of development which they would have naturally passed through if they had been allowed expression. According to this view, cure comes about by the *liberation* of tendencies and the relief of the dissociation, so that these liberated tendencies find their opportunity for natural development. If the mind is, as McDougall holds, essentially dynamic and conative, and disorders come about by the repression and dissociation of these forces, we must assume that there is some force or conative tendency at work to perpetuate the dissociation. In actual experience the method of abreaction proceeds by arousing the repressed tendency, such as fear in the "shell shock" case, and it is this emotion which, when aroused, breaks down the dissociation. In civilian cases the repressed emotion is less strongly toned, and we proceed by dissipating the repressing forces of the Ego, overcoming the resistances, and so breaking the dissociation. Thus the force making for the reunion may come from either side. This is supported by the fact that in an amnesia it is often the emotional reaction that the patient experiences first, and he only later gives it cognitive content and recognises the dissociated element. It remains true that when the dissociation is broken down then the liberated emotion flows with fuller expression. In technique and practice we require to link up the affect with its original cognitive element. If the expressed part is an emotion, as in a phobia, we need to discover its original cause: if it is non-emotional, like a hysterical symptom, we need to discover and liberate the original affect.

Whilst then we agree with McDougall with regard to the relief of the dissociation as a fundamental factor in cure, we suggest that this is often not only facilitated by but initiated from the repressed experience and that it is what happens *after* the relief of the dissociation, namely the free development of the affective tendencies, which really is the cure.

We agree also with McDougall in regarding the therapeutic value of 'abreaction" and cognate methods of freeing affect, not as the reliving of the experiences, but the breaking down of the dissociation: but we go further in regarding the cure as due to the conative tendencies being liberated and so pursuing their normal development. Although "abreaction," as a name and method, was abandoned with the abandonment of the "traumatic" theory of the psychoneuroses, it lives again in the theory of "transference" which to the psycho-analyst is an essential part of the curative process and which is nothing more than a living again of affective experiences proper to childhood. It is possible, therefore, to keep to what was essential in "abreaction," namely, the liberation of affect, without holding to the traumatic theory of the psychoneuroses.

Nature of Functional Disorder. One of the most brilliant chapters in the book is that in which McDougall discusses the "Nature of Functional Disorders"—a chapter which must be read by all those interested in the Psychoneuroses. In the "Outline of Normal Psychology" he has demonstrated the *purposive* nature of mental functions as fundamental. He backs his argument here by pointing out that the very idea of 'function' implies a purpose. "Any material system of working parts or masses which does not express a purpose, which is not the embodiment of a purpose or design, cannot properly be said to be subject to disorder." A clock is a mass of moving parts which *has* purpose, therefore its function can be disordered: the planets, on the other hand, cannot be said to be 'disordered' when they collide. This may be a cataclysm, it cannot be called a disorder of function to be distinguished from activity: the heart may be excessively active, but we say it is disordered in function when it does not fulfil the function of sustaining the circulation. So McDougall argues to the nature of functional nervous disorders, which are disorders in so far as our end or purpose is not fulfilled. He points out that "by means of flight from disease one achieves definite aims through the disease, that is, the disorder is in some sense the achievement of a purposive activity." So the structure and mechanism of the body may be whole, whereas if it is not directed to its right purpose we have a functional nervous disorder.

McDougall then asks the interesting question: "Can mental disease be not only psychogenetic in origin, but also essentially functional in nature, without there having set up any organic changé secondary to the functional disturbances?"

McDougall answers this in the affirmative, and, further, holds that "the mind has a nature and a structure of its own which cannot be adequately described in terms of structure of the brain and its physical processes. And if this be true it does not seem logically impossible that this nature of the mind itself may be disordered or impaired or defective."

Upon this basis he argues the possibility of dementia praecox being a psychogenetic disorder. Admitting the findings of Mott that there is in this condition a degeneration of cells in the brain, and maldevelopment of the sex glands, he asks whether it is not possible that hypo-function, the continued diminution of function, is not the *cause* of the lowered oxidation, and other organic changes following. "If there is," says McDougall, "serious and long continued maladjustment of the sex functions, or other instinctive activities, on the mental side, this can hardly fail to react prejudicially on the development of the sex glands and on the endocrine glands which they influence, and through them perhaps often the development of neuroses in the brain concerned in these functions" (p. 44). This argument has not been sufficiently considered by most physiologists, who are dominated by the view that structure alone determines function, although the organic effects of disuse of a limb, producing hypo-function, is obvious.

McDougall adds, "besides all cases claimed as dementia praecox, I think we are justified in looking for functional origin of manic-depressive and epileptic insanities, even though we recognize that when these are well established, structural and chemical disorders play an important part."

But the whole of this chapter well deserves careful study on the part of the reader.

We have dealt possibly too much with the critical side of our Review, but in a case of this kind where the reader will do himself justice only by reading

the book, a summary would have been inadequate and constructive criticism perhaps more useful. But the mass of material contained in this book, such, for instance, as the quoted cases of dual personality, culled from various quarters, to say nothing of the original views expressed, will amply repay the reader, not only to read, but to purchase the book.

J. A. HADFIELD.

REVIEWS.

Character and the Conduct of Life. By WILLIAM MCDOUGALL, M.B., F.R.S. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd. 1927. Pp. 287. 10*s.* 6*d.* net.

When an author enjoying the esteem and respect of countless readers of psychological treatises puts his name to a work bearing the imposing title of *Character and the Conduct of Life*, he cannot blame us if we open his book with some anticipation and not a little apprehension. We may reasonably expect to find therein distillations from an erudite mind ceaselessly occupied with problems of human conduct; but we are not unfamiliar with the fact that when psychologists turn from observation to exhortation their apophthegmatic utterances are apt to result in a certain mildew of the reputation. The former consideration has clearly been present in the minds of both author and publisher. We are informed on the cover that the book is dedicated to the service of those "who desire to make the best of themselves and their few years of life..." and the author himself in his preface clinches the matter. He assumes the rôle of sophist and offers us an "essay in practical morals." But his preface is no mere apologia; by way of comment on the acquiring of experience he informs us that "in all that relates to sex a cool, clear, objective judgment first became possible after my fiftieth year." This is a hard saying from one who sets out to help younger folk to acquire wisdom more rapidly, and when it is coupled with some animadversions on the mechanized conditions of existence for 'modern youth,' we are left with the uneasy feeling that the price of acquiring experience from Professor McDougall may prove to be more than a little toleration of his foibles.

The first chapter though brief offers us little respite from these qualms. Parents cannot handle their children as before and youth is busy throwing things into the melting pot. "The *Götterdämmerung* is upon us." It may be so: but the cry has a familiar plaintive ring. If it be so, if his view of modernity points correctly to dangerous tendencies which may threaten our social structure with catastrophe, it is cold comfort to be told in the same chapter that our counter measures will for all practical purposes depend on reflective self-criticism. Indeed our apprehensions concerning the book itself are bound to deepen, for the author has in effect committed himself to provide us with some sort of prophylactic suggestions. He is an acknowledged master of the art of conscious introspection, and, if this be the only way out, to whom else may we turn for help, should he fail us?

Now as to the book itself. It separates naturally into two parts, a systematic description of character-processes and development, followed by a number of exhortative chapters addressed to "all whom it may concern," parents and children, girls, young men, wives, husbands and senescents. There are some notes appended on the management of the body. With regard to the systematic part it is only fair to say that had Professor McDougall been content to "stick to his last" it would rank as one of the simplest and clearest expositions of his own psychological system he has given us, and that, in view of his

existing reputation for clarity and good writing, would be no mean compliment. It would, of course, be open to adherents of other schools of psychological opinion to say that whilst excellently presented, it illustrated the usual inadequacies and superficialities incident to his method of approach. That would be fair fighting and doubtless Professor McDougall would regard it as the more touching compliment of the two. Unfortunately there are two serious blemishes on this section. Whether pricked by some internal mentor or guided by some imp of perversity, the author cannot resist frequent digs at Freudian Psychology. In the midst of expounding his own views on character-formation he steps aside on several occasions to single out Freudian views for comment of a disembowelling variety. At other points he makes use of terminology which has a strictly Freudian connotation. It reminds one of the complaint of Man after Twashtri created Woman: What is to be done? for I cannot live either with or without her?

For this is not the first occasion when Professor McDougall has expressed some modification of his earlier implacable opposition to Freudian doctrine; his *Outline of Abnormal Psychology* provides even more ample evidence of a change of front. But it is not within the scope of this review to maintain or demonstrate that the more he changes, the more unchanged he remains. For one thing a great majority of his readers will find themselves in entire agreement with his views on this matter. Nevertheless the gravamen of the present charge is incontestable; one cannot help thinking that his excursions into criticism of the 'New Psychology' detract from the value of his presentation and are liable to be read by a more discerning public as part of his uneasy reaction to an oncoming generation.

So we may omit any further consideration of polemical material on Freud; in like wise one need only mention without further comment some opinions expressed (*e.g.* on sex-tendencies and love, on the absence of emotional tendency and frigidity, on the modification of tendencies, on the nature of habit, etc.) which in any other setting would merit some critical attention. This leaves the way free to advance the second objection to the systematic part, one which incidentally applies to the whole book. It may be expressed by saying that the title might well be amended in future editions to read: "The Conduct of Life for the Kind of People who, if they would, could afford to buy this Book." Of course, Professor McDougall is too careful an observer to be side-tracked from his main purpose by any preoccupation with class psychology. But a writer on the Conduct of Life assumes certain responsibilities, one of which is that his illustrative material should be drawn from the widest possible sources: moreover, his recommendations should, roughly speaking, be valid for all classes of adults excepting always neurotic, psychotic, defective or criminal groupings. There can be no question that in his theoretical analysis of character and conduct the author tabulates various reactions which are descriptively true for the race as a whole. But every now and then, and especially in the latter part of the book, one gets the impression that he is unduly preoccupied with the social reactions of a small sub-section of a small class. There are occasional frosty allusions to 'petting parties': youth is envisaged as taking its recreation in future by aeroplane over deserts, education brings to his mind preparatory and public schools, his young people are addicted to powder, bridge and dancing, their parents, as we shall see later, sleep in middle-class bedrooms and eat leisurely breakfasts, indulging at the same time regrettable propensities to read newspapers. All this is no reflection on the quality

of his generalizations, but it gives us grounds for suspecting the motivations behind the present publication.

The second half of the book tends rather to confirm the suspicion that Professor McDougall's interest in formulating rules to guide the conduct of life has been seriously vitiated by his own emotional reactions to details of social conduct in a society which might be described as a hasty emulsification of Fitzjohn's Avenue, Kensington, and Chelsea cum Bloomsbury. This conflict of interests has unfortunate results. When his mind is free from emotional bias the author gives precisely the kind of advice one would expect from a man of his ripe years, sympathetic outlook and disciplined intelligence. On these occasions he is neither banal nor meretricious, but offers his public a considerable amount of what is usually called 'sound sense.' One can well imagine that, backed by the authority of his own personality, these exhortative gifts would be weighty assets in any psycho-therapeutic practice Professor McDougall might care to pursue. But when he is overcome by the itch to play Protagoras to an erring post-war flock the effect is rather disastrous. The slightly expostulatory manner he adopts on occasion serves only to throw into relief one facet of a personality a little too easily irritated by finger nails (p. 263) or worried by the idea of auto-intoxication (p. 122), disgusted by public application of powder (p. 83), darkly suspicious about dancing (p. 236), hostile to the indifference of a younger generation (p. 201), quite frankly shocked by some of their reported habits (p. 219), fretted by the domestic details of life (p. 245), and rather relieved to find himself on the lee side of instinctual excitation (p. x).

Whilst sample references are given above to some of the sources of information, it would be impossible without extensive quotation to do justice to the material from which the above conclusion is drawn. In the same way one must be content with indicating that on some occasions the advice offered is an open invitation to ribaldry. The chapters on "Married Life," "Husbands" and "Wives" contain not a few examples. One wonders, for instance, what special virtue is hinted at in the latter part of the following quotation (italicized by the reviewer) re marital privacy: "The best possible sleeping arrangement is two adjoining single beds *made up with covers as one.*" Or again, re newspapers at breakfast, it might be asked whether the thousands of mild depressive types existing amongst our 'normal' population, stung, as they are, by the early morning scorpions of undigested sadism, will gain very much by deflecting their aggression from the appointed whipping-posts they prop against matutinal coffee-pots.

But it is manifestly unfair to elaborate criticism in this vein. In any case Professor McDougall could retort with some justice that he has risked ridicule in a courageous attempt to deal with the ragged edges of social and domestic communion. That is undoubtedly true and it would be ungracious to deny the measure of success he has attained. But it may also be legitimately suggested that his policy of providing ready-made recipes for the strains of everyday life is a reactionary one. After all the rags and tatters which disturb family felicity are more often than not the distress signals of more fundamental conflict. A treatise on the Conduct of Life which omits to focus these powerful unconscious factors runs the risk of being dubbed timid, no matter how boldly its author enunciates rules of conduct for all and sundry.

EDWARD GLOVER.

Everyday Problems of the Everyday Child. By DOUGLAS A. THOM. New York and London. 1927. D. Appleton & Co. Pp. xiv + 350. 10*s.* 6*d.* net.

The purely scientific knowledge of one generation may become a familiar fact of everyday life to the next; twenty years ago how many were conversant with phenomena of wave-lengths, interference, etc.? To-day, how many households can be found where these are unknown in their practical aspects? And the change has not come about through scientific propaganda. Similarly, we may believe that the scientific psychology associated with the name of Freud may in time become in its practical aspects the familiar stock-in-trade of all interested in the understanding of human nature; in this wide class must of course be numbered all parents, and parental substitutes who hope for some light on the baffling intricacies of child life and its development. Among the books which undramatically and unobtrusively will help to bring this about place must be accorded to Dr Thom's *Everyday Problems of the Everyday Child.*

From the point of view of the puzzled parent who knows little, but wishes to know more, this is a book of good sound common sense, with practical advice, sympathetic understanding of difficulties of parent as well as child, modest in statement and aim, keeping again from these parents', but not the experts', point of view a re-assuring balance between extremes of past and present: candour on sexual problems, doubt as to the full Freudian position, *e.g.* "All one can say at the present time is that if thumb-sucking is evidence of sexual strivings, so is scratching the head and picking the nose; and to accept this doctrine one would have to assume quite a different conception of sexual activity from that which is held by most intelligent people at the present time." Unfortunately this is not a matter which can be settled by majorities even of the intelligentsia.

One could give many quotations showing Dr Thom's real understanding of the child's mentality, *e.g.* his recognition of elasticity necessary in adjustment of the parent-child relationship during growing years. "It is an adjustment...which involves a relationship that does not lend itself well to rules and regulations and premeditated plans" (p. 27). "Do not minimize, criticize or ridicule the fears of childhood. They are deserving of your intelligent interest and sympathetic understanding." His treatment of the 'laziness' question again is good and understanding.

But precisely because much is so good, and because Dr Thom is capable of such an open-minded objective attitude, one cries for more. And to my mind the central problem of childhood remains untouched, and this largely because of the angle of approach which is inevitable in Habit Clinics and Child Guidance Clinics, etc. This is the problem, and a very baffling one it is: the *fundamental* stability of the child mind in its instinctive urges, and in its attitude to them, *i.e.* the infantile super-ego; allied with a possibility of a chameleon-like change of front in every other way: a plasticity which subserves the vital necessity of preserving the core unchanged. To the plasticity full justice is done in this book: the underlying stability has no mention; therefore the total picture presented, if regarded as complete, is a false one in spite of its many excellences; the essence of the phenomena of repression is absent.

This is the angle of vision which hides this most important part of the problem: the majority of children seen in Habit and Child Guidance Clinics

come from homes in which ignorance is rampant and mistakes are obvious: transference is the only power in the world which can bring about alterations in people, and it is used well and wisely in changing the attitude of parent to child as well as of child to parent: parents are grateful to shift some of their responsibility and to be met with sympathetic help and understanding, while to the child, tortured inwardly, however outwardly indifferent, this sudden divesting of very big Authority of all its harshness, and its investment with an almost miraculous understanding of hidden problems, means a revolution in its small world, and a possibility of a very far-reaching adjustment. However, no *fundamental* alteration of parent or child has been made, and if situations of difficulty in any way resembling the earlier ones recur, the same problems, though perhaps in a different guise, will inevitably recur, and will need bigger and bigger 'transference' doses if they are to be safely weathered. Not for a moment do I minimize the importance of work done in such clinics. It is not within the bounds of possibility that all problem children can go through the long process of more fundamental treatment, and it is a very big thing indeed if, owing to this fluidity of all but the deepest 'layers' of the child mind, such alterations can be brought about as make the child educable and socialized as long as conditions are tolerable to it. I would only emphasize the inevitability in such conditions of the placing of the accent on plasticity of the child mind and the importance of environmental changes—for in these lie all the hope, and the danger of losing sight entirely of this other at least equally important fact—the rock-like stability of the child's earliest mental formations, and their extraordinarily slight relation to any reality of environment. It is when we meet children with severe neurotic traits coming from homes in which we should find it difficult to suggest environmental changes: a child of five developing a severe neurosis precisely after his introduction to a much more tolerant environment and immensely increased enjoyment because it did not provide him with the punishment his unchanged baby ideal demanded; a child not yet three brought up with the wisest toleration, and mildest understanding, who will violently beat, hurt and throw away play-children of his own who have behaved as he himself has done, in his own case without even a reproving glance: it is then that we have to recognize that the picture presented to us by Dr Thom and other workers in Child Guidance Clinics needs to be supplemented to become scientific.

Minor criticisms can be made referring to matters of detail which yet are indications of some uncertainty of psychological outlook. But, when all is said, we have here a book which is the product of much experience and wisdom, and which but a few years ago would have seemed revolutionary in character.

M. N. Searl.

"Les Premiers Mots de l'Enfant et l'apparition des espèces de mots dans son langage." By Elemer Kenyeres, Dr.phil., Professeur à l'École normale de Budapest. *Archives de Psychologie*, tome xx, No. 79 (Fév. 1927).

It is refreshing to find an author bold enough to break away from tradition concerning theories about the first words of the Child to some extent, even if not bold enough to pursue research to determine their motivating causes. We still find little appreciable interest in the vocal communications of children before the language of adults is attempted or imitated, and one is led to imagine

that recognition of grammatical forms by the child, or at least some knowledge of their existence, is usually assumed, since this author expressly remarks that very young children make use of alterations in words to denote the plural or case endings before they are able to grasp their significance.

In the course of this most interesting paper, we find many statements of observations made by Dr Kenyeres, without full appreciation of their actual value or significance. But this may be because the aim of the paper does not seem to be to shed light upon the *determining causes* of the child's acquisition of speech, but rather to determine the sequence of the appearance of those 'first words' and grammatical forms.

One of the most just conclusions reached by the author is that we are not justified in separating the early stages of child language into the substantive and the verb or action phases, since at this stage the infant will use one word to designate in turn a *substantive*, an *action*, a *quality* or even a *place*. We are left to guess which is the correct interpretation from some supplementary gesture or vocal inflection. Dr Kenyeres, however, is interested only in the first *words* uttered by a baby, and does not extend his observations to various other means of expression with which the infant ekes out his sparse vocabulary.

Again, the author departs from the theory of Preyer, Compayré and others, to endorse that of Meumann that the first words of the child do not represent *concepts* but are rather *affective and volitional*; that is, they express a feeling or wish of the child. This aspect of the single word phrase of the child is treated with considerable detail, yet no reference is made to the theory of the child's regarding words as having a concrete and almost creative value, put forward by the author's brilliant compatriot, Dr Sandor Ferenczi, nor to the views of other writers who have made important contributions to our knowledge of this subject by showing that we may find an origin of speech in the wish to satisfy a want, by the repetition of a sound that represents by action what is needed. This shows the origin of the *onomatopoeic word*, which is thought by many philologists to be the basis of primitive speech, and akin to the imitative magic of primitive races. This theory was put forward by Dr Sabina Spielrein in a paper read before the Psycho-analytical Congress held at the Hague in 1918, "Zur Frage der Entstehung und Entwicklung der Lautsprache," in which she traced the usual first word of the infant, *Mama*, to the repetition of the action of the lips in sucking the motive of the infant being to call the mother so that his wish may be gratified.

Dr Kenyeres also points out in the text of his paper, although he has omitted it from his summary, that vocal exercise was primarily adopted by the infant because of the *pleasure* to be derived from the function of the vocal organs, and that early speech is largely imitative. To reinforce this statement we are told that it is "most probably the cadence and melody of the words which first attract the child's attention and that he will in the first place pronounce words the *rhythm* of which has struck him." Again, later on, he remarks that the baby *mechanically* repeats words and phrases which are most common in his environment, but often incorrectly, and so altered that the sonorous elements will be emphasised and those presenting difficulties to the particular infant will be left out.

It is clear that the baby does not know the significance of the spoken word or the relation of the various elements in a sentence. They will be reproduced as in a musical phrase and at first recognized in the same way, connected in

the child's mind with any number of other impressions that occurred simultaneously, that will subsequently *all* be designated by the single word.

Grammatical forms, the use of pronouns and adverbs are learnt by the same means—imitation, the chief requisites for which are auditory discrimination and a faculty for correct reproduction rather than intellectual appreciation of the whys and wherefores of causation and declension. Yet in this paper we find no reference to the auditory acuity of the child; and although there is an acknowledgment of the fact that whilst the child may adopt the word *because* comparatively late, there are also many adults who have almost entirely suppressed it from their vocabulary. The factor of imitation is here omitted as a cause of the child's use of words and the sequence of the acquisition of grammatical forms. Thus, in the baby's first year, we speak to him in infantile language, with the use of proper names rather than personal pronouns, which will lead the child to adopt the same method. As the child grows older we change our phraseology, laugh at the child for the old habit and suddenly confuse him with the substitution of another. We also find the use of the words *I* and *we* keeping pace with the child's dawning conception of the idea of the *Self*, a point of view which the author does not seem to have taken into consideration.

In the later pages of this valuable paper we lose trace of the importance of imitation. Dr Kenyeres has stated the facts quite plainly but unaccountably seems to forget them again when he most needs them, namely, in working out his many interesting deductions concerning the first words of the child.

MARY CHADWICK.

Shell Shock and its aftermath. By NORMAN FENTON, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Psychology, Ohio University; formerly at Base Hospital 117, A.E.F., and with the National Committee for Mental Hygiene. With an Introduction by THOMAS W. SALMON, M.D., Professor of Psychiatry, Columbia University, etc. Illustrated. St Louis: C. V. Mosby Co. 1926. Pp. 173. $3.00.

This book gets its chief value from the fact that it represents two follow-ups, one in 1919 and the other in 1924, of nearly a thousand veterans observed by the author in Base 117 in 1917 and 1918 (among 2273 seen in that hospital) who came under the category of 'shell-shocked.' We, who are working with this class of patients still, realize deeply that this expression and its wide usage among the laity of America and of England were most unfortunate, because tending, like other concept-handles, to make still commoner and to fix these functional conditions, all of which are more or less allied medically to hysteria. This is one of the lessons from the War which few foresaw, these few being quite unable to check the unfortunate suggestion inherent in the name.

Thirteen 'groups' in Base 117, A.E.F. (at La Fauche, in the foothills of the Vosges Mountains, in the advanced sector of the service of supplies, and about thirty miles from the front line), comprised this war-neurotic group of 2273 men or more, namely, "neurasthenia, psychasthenia, hypochondriasis, hysteria, anxiety neurosis, anticipation neurosis, exhaustion, effort-syndrome, timorousness, gas, concussion, malingering, and psychoneuroses," recovered (S. I. Schwab).

Much of the substance of this extensive and valuable report consists of

statistics, tables, and classifications, etc., not readily and perhaps not very usefully given in a review. The chapter-topics afford the reader the book's make-up: "The problem of shell-shock in the A.E.F.; Base Hospital 117, A.E.F.; description of a typical group of men who developed war-neurosis; mental and physical make-up of a typical group of A.E.F. shell-shock victims; social and economic background of these men; the war-neurotic back home, 1919–20; the condition of these war-neurotics shortly after their return to America; what the American nation has done for its shell-shocked veterans since the Armistice; how the shell-shocked veteran has adjusted himself to civilian life; [and] the nature of war-neurosis and its aftermath." There are twelve statistical graphs and one illustration, and there is an adequate index.

Did space allow, the late Dr Salmon's introduction would be quoted in full, for it contains in little most of the philosophy of the psychoneuroses. We will be content with two sentences of it: "Starting out with no thesis to support, he [the author] has shown the seriousness of any severe psychoneurotic manifestation and the persistence of a tendency to react unfavourably to adverse conditions even when the symptoms of the original neurosis have been successfully dealt with. On the other hand, he has shown a definite relationship existing between make-up, personal, resources, and access to treatment and complete rehabilitation that confirms a growing belief in the usefulness of adequate therapy and prophylaxis in psychopathic disorders."

Dr Fenton, unlike many students of psychoneurosis, recognizes the importance of habit therein—and habit is a condition too often ignored by the unpsychological physician even of the psychiatric speciality—for who knows, even yet, less of psychology than the average graduate of a medical school? Isn't this situation absurd?

With a quotation from the book's final page we must leave the reader to the volume itself from some book-shop or library: "Until recently in fact only the wealthy could have adequate hospital or even medical care for psychoneurosis in the most progressive communities. An explanation for this neglect is the feeling that there is really nothing the matter except imagination —with these men. Yet so great a medical man as William J. Mayo is quoted as having said: 'Neurasthenia, psychasthenia, hysteria, and allied neuroses are the causes of more human misery than tuberculosis or cancer.' The actual extent of the problem in England is given by Sir John Collie, who estimates that more than 200,000 men were discharged from active service with these disorders in the British Army. Moreover, it must be realized that all the vagaries and ramifications of the pension issue are society's product and should not be used cynically to explain away what is a real condition in ill-adapted ex-soldiers."

One of the factors of this problem in both its martial and its industrial aspects (the latter of far greater importance though less romantic) is only hinted at vaguely by our author, namely, the tremendous importance of constitutional psychopathy in its various (six or seven) most common aspects. Most of the psychoneurotics are constitutionally inferior personalities one way or another—hard as it is to have to admit it in many actual cases.

Dr Fenton's work deserves far wider reading than it is apt to get, for it concerns itself with a wide problem, and one very deep withal, in the psychological medicine of society. In the case-files of the Veterans Bureau there is material for a master-study.

GEORGE VAN NESS DEARBORN.

Postencephalitic Respiratory Disorders. By SMITH ELY JELLIFFE, M.D., Ph.D. Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co. 1927. Pp. ii + 135.

The study of postencephalitic sequelae is one of extreme interest, and this is enhanced by the wide scope for hypothesis offered and by the very real difficulties encountered. Amongst the sequelae are to be found several symptoms, *e.g.* respiratory disturbances, fixation of the eyes, certain bradykinesic phenomena and speech anomalies, which in themselves appear to combine elements of the organic and the functional. Dr Jelliffe's contribution to the problem is, in this monograph, confined to respiratory disorders. The first 73 pages are given up to an historical résumé of the clinical material and to a fuller report of two of the author's own cases. Then follows a short review of the symptomatology of some of these cases and a discussion of the possible pathological interpretations. The real object of the monograph is confined to the last 35 pages. In these the author presents his case for the purely psychopathological interpretation of these problems and as a natural corollary advances psychoanalysis as the most hopeful form of therapy. His argument is unconvincing. In the first place, his clinical evidence depends upon a single analysed case and upon certain dream interpretations of this case and another. That certain oral and laryngeal anomalies are based on fixations at the oral stage of development and that some facial and respiratory spasms are symbolic of the sexual orgasm is a commonplace of psychoanalysis, but that those disorders of respiratory mechanism associated with Chronic Encephalitis Lethargica belong to this category by no means follows. Again, the content of practically all dreams can be resolved in terms of psychoanalytic interpretation, but that is no evidence that all symptoms of disease displayed by the dreamer are of psychosexual origin. The author appears to forget that dream interpretation is solely an adjunct to analysis and is mere guesswork, unless combined with an intimate knowledge of the unconscious workings of the patient's mind. His dream analyses are worthless as isolated studies. He does not deny that the respiratory disorders of Chronic Encephalitis Lethargica are obviously attributable to the disease, but attempts to correlate this fact with his theories by presuming that there is a regression of function owing to the disuse of brain centres affected or cut off by the encephalitic process. He suggests that the Super Ego (censor) mechanism is broken down by the ravages of the disease with the result that the appearance of conversion symptoms is facilitated. Unfortunately logical errors abound in his argument. Dr Jelliffe writes: "In so far as great trauma is inflicted upon the vegetative mechanisms of the thalamic and striatal levels, it is not unreasonable to argue that the task of mastering instinct stimuli is greatly interfered with...." This entails an unwarrantable assumption that control or instinct stimuli is a function of the thalamus or striatal region. He suggests that the lack of impulse, the desire to stay in bed is an unconscious death-wish. How does he reconcile this with the fact that it is only seen in Parkinsonians, whilst non-Parkinsonian Encephalitics, whether suffering from respiratory disorders or not, show an increased motor and mental restlessness? Does he consider the whole of the Parkinsonian syndrome as of psychogenic origin? The considerable evidence in favour of the organic nature of these symptoms and the striking amelioration brought about in them under the influence of certain drugs, *e.g.* hyoscine, is given scant consideration. The author wholeheartedly condemns the practice of labelling the lesser understood sequelae of Chronic Encephalitis Lethargica

as 'Hysteria' and leaving it at that. Here he will undoubtedly have few dissentients but his equally strong denunciation of discipline as a useful therapeutic measure in certain cases will not be acceptable to many whose knowledge of psychology and of Encephalitis is equally extensive. Lastly, it is to be regretted that his attitude towards physicians who employ therapeutic methods alien to his own opinions leads him to such a statement as, "Unfortunately some morons still can prosper in the medical profession." Dr Jelliffe's monograph cannot be recommended as an unbiased or scientific attempt to solve the problems of postencephalitic respiratory disorders, and is one that is liable to bring disrepute upon the methods of intelligent psychoanalysts in the eyes of the uninitiated.

L. C. Cook.

Therapeutic Malaria. By G. de M. Rudolf. Oxford Medical Publications, 1927. Pp. xi + 223. 12*s.* 6*d.* net.

This volume contains a comprehensive account of the malarial therapy of general paralysis in particular with a brief mention of its application in certain other nervous disorders. A chapter is devoted to the mental changes occurring during and after the treatment, in which the author has recorded a number of interesting observations. Auditory hallucinations appear to develop with considerable frequency in the incubation and febrile periods. Mental confusion is another not uncommon accompaniment of the malarial paroxysms. In the majority of those cases who benefit from malarial therapy improvement is to be noted towards the end or soon after the series of febrile paroxysms. The book deals with a variety of aspects of malarial therapy and should be in the hands of all who employ this mode of treatment.

W. S. Dawson.

ABSTRACTS.

Psychological Abstracts, vol. I, No. 1, Jan. 1927.

These are published monthly by the American Psychological Association under the general editorship of Walter S. Hunter and Raymond R. Willoughby of Clark University. In format and length they resemble *Science Abstracts* and like that valuable periodical are divided into sections, viz.: General; Sensation and Perception; Feeling and Emotion; Attention, Memory and Thought; Nervous System; Motor Phenomena and Action; Plant and Animal Behaviour; Evolution and Heredity; Special Mental Conditions; Nervous and Mental Disorders; Social Functions of the Individual; Industrial and Personnel Problems; Childhood and Adolescence; Educational Psychology; Biometry and Statistics; Mental Tests. The classification of papers from the world's literature in psychology and closely related subjects is necessarily somewhat arbitrary but the clear arrangement, use of leaded type, italics, etc., makes rapid searching an easy matter, so the inevitable disadvantage is practically overcome. The abstracts are non-critical and are all signed. The yearly volume will run to about 600 pages and is priced at $6.00 (Foreign $6.25). [London Agents: G. E. Stechert & Co., 2, Star Yard, Cary Street, W.C.]

A publication of this character has been needed for a long time.

J. R.

The Forum of Education, vol. IV, No. 2.

The following papers are of some interest to readers of this *Journal*:

EVE MACAULAY, B.A. *An Investigation into the Development of the Moral Conceptions of Children* (II). In this enquiry children were asked to reply to two questions:

(1) What person whom you have ever known, or of whom you have ever heard or read, would you most wish to resemble?

(2) Give a list of the reasons which make you choose this person.

Clear age differences in the type of persons chosen appeared. "The child from 7 to 9 years old chooses from his little ring of acquaintances a child friend or else a relation; from 10 to 13, children choose adult acquaintances to a certain extent, but more generally a king or a character which has had a gay and adventurous life. In early adolescence the acquaintance ideal is revived in the person of an older friend of the same sex as the writer; historical characters, when chosen, are selected for social services; by 19 the characters are either acquaintances, well-known contemporaries, or great social servants of the past century." More interesting, however, than the type of character chosen are the reasons given for the choice, and these again show definite age types. "The young child will choose Captain Cook 'because he could go in a boat.' The 11 years old 'because he visited all parts of the world.' The adolescent 'because of the great services he rendered to his country.' At 7 the King is envied for his crown and jewels; at 17 for his opportunities of serving his subjects. The main desire of all pre-adolescent children is for power to assert

themselves as strong and rich and dominating before the world. The young adolescent wishes to be powerful but good, the young adult to be a noble character."..."The general inference to be drawn from the whole enquiry is that children define as wrong what they are told is wrong up to adolescence, without qualification and without conviction. Of moral good they have very little conception, and for it no predominating desire." Some of the individual material is of considerable interest, particularly that obtained from children showing definite emotional instability or neurotic tendency. Two of the most interesting are the following:

(1) Girl, 13. Known morbid tendencies, has shown herself to be sexually morally defective.

St Agnes. She believed and had faith in God. She was not afraid to die. She had no fears for laws, threats, or punishments. She died as a martyr to God, the lies, the whips, the scourges, she took no notice. She tried her best to make others Christians. She was no coward but died like a Christian. She was beautiful. When the law was made that all Christians found preaching and still carried on as a Christian should be burned at the stake, she was the only one that carried on. Even at the stake she would not give up her faith for life, and she suffered at the stake as a witch.

Crimes. Cruelty, theft, lies, put you to death for innocence's sake, to spite you, to make a drudge of you, to hate you, to kick you about, to ill-treat you, to carry you away from those you love, to keep you waiting for death, to beat you with sticks with salt on, to starve you, to burn you.

(2) Boy, 12. Cinema influence on a retarded character is here shown.

Rudolph Valentino. Because he is handsome, highly talented, and fascinating. His films are so good. He has wonderful eyes, at times they are as slumberous as a tiger's, at others they flare up with passionate love. He is an exquisite lover, fascinating girls and women alike. Because of his quiet but stately bearing.

Crimes. Put anyone's eyes out, to murder, idolatry, false witness against thy neighbour, gambling, adultery, suicide, to lead a blind person out of his way, deceit, burglary, to break the hearts of women, forgery, to pretend that you like a person and to say nasty things behind his back, to poison.

ERIC M. RHODES. *When should a Child begin School? An Experimental Enquiry.* The investigation was carried out on three groups of 12-year-old boys by a series of tests in mathematics, memory, general knowledge, and hand and eye work. Comparisons were then made in the achievements of those among these children who entered the school at 4 years, at 5 years and at 6 years of age respectively. The conclusions were very clear, that the only advantage gained for a child by entering school at the age of 4 years is one of mechanical manipulative skill with material. Those who enter later do decidedly better in arithmetic, and at least as well in tests of information.

So far so good, but, of course, the investigation is of too narrow a scope to be able to settle the question of when children should begin school. It nowhere touches the problems of the social life of the young child, and the advantages of contact with other children for normal emotional development And the author's final sentence: "The first two years of school life at present seem, therefore, to be using up money which could be well spent in other branches of education," is a bold dogma to build upon so meagre a foundation.

Ibid. No. 3.

C. S. SLOCOMBE, Ph.D. *The Influence of Practice in Mental Tests.* "The effect of varying amounts of practice received by children prior to their being tested for intelligence is discussed.

"It was found on investigation that the earlier test-forms in a test are impaired in their efficiency by the lack of habituation to the conditions; it is therefore suggested that an adequate amount of fore-practice should be given before each occasion of testing.

"It was also found that if children be tested twice, with similar tests, the first test is influenced by varying amounts of practice received, but that on second testing all disturbing factors are reduced to a minimum. It is therefore suggested that, in important cases, two tests should be given, the marks obtained in the second test only being taken into account."

M. W. KEATINGE, M.A., D.Sc. *Recent Developments in Method.* Dr Keatinge makes a general and illuminating survey of fundamental changes in general pedagogical methods, and holds that these have been in the main due to five factors: "(*a*) a new psychological standpoint; (*b*) the introduction of experimental science accompanied by a new interest in the logic of discovery; (*c*) a new social outlook; (*d*) a fuller treatment of the theory of aesthetics; (*e*) the introduction of mechanical contrivances such as the cinema and broadcasting." The 'new psychological standpoint' is that of the discarding of the intellectualist conception of mind and of the recognition of the psychology of the individual pupil.

Ibid. vol. v, No. 1.

A. G. HUGHES, M.Sc., M.Ed. *The 'Repetition Compulsion': Some Observations on Routine and Rhythm.* Mr Hughes makes some very wise observations in this brief paper. He starts by contrasting Professor Nunn's view of the 'Routine Tendency' as an expression of the will to live, with Freud's view of the 'Repetitive Compulsion' as an expression of the will to die. He hardly attempts, and certainly does not succeed, in reconciling these diverse views theoretically, but his remarks as to the importance in one direction or another of the routine tendency in the process of education are very suggestive. He points out that many of the repetitive actions of the young child are of the hypnotic type and not necessarily valuable for development. "Some of the cases of concentrated attention quoted by Montessorians may well come within the category of hypnotic repetition, especially when one considers how the repetition of activities must be influenced by mass suggestion." It is suggested, in general, that repetition and routine are of value to the child only so long as they are spontaneous and joyful, because then they are not mere repetition, for development is going on and the situation changing internally for the child from moment to moment. Without external pressure the child will cease to repeat, will turn away from, for example, a story, or the practice of a new skill, on which he has been concentrated for a week or a month, and will take no more notice of it for a long period. This periodicity of young children's interests which, as Mr Hughes says, is a marked feature of their behaviour if they are left free to work out their own impulses is clearly a very important aspect of their development, and for educators to run counter to it in attempting to establish a rhythm of effort and attention that is more adult in type is bound to be wasteful and exhausting to the children.

EVE MACAULAY, B.A. *Portrait Studies of Some Exceptional Children.* These offer some interesting material, although no theoretical analysis is made.

S. ISAACS.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE BRITISH PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIETY, MEDICAL SECTION.

(*Previous Notices in this Journal*, Vol. I, p. 96; Vol. II, p. 99; Vol. V, p. 64; Vol. V, p. 160.)

1925

October 28th. *Joint Meeting with the Psychiatry Section of the Royal Society of Medicine.* A Symposium on "The Early Treatment of Mental Disorders." For the R.S.M. Psychiatry Section: Sir MAURICE CRAIG. For the British Psychological Society, Medical Section: WILLIAM BROWN.

November 25th. The Neurotic Character. By EDWARD GLOVER.

December 16th. *Annual Meeting.* Address from the Chair[1]. Divergent Tendencies in Psychotherapy. By JAMES GLOVER.

1926

January 27th. Investigations into the Predisposition to Breakdown. By MILLAIS CULPIN.

February 24th. A Hypothetical Mental Constitution of Compulsive Thinkers. By JOHN T. MACCURDY.

March 8th. *Joint Meeting with Education Section.* A Symposium on "The Definition and Diagnosis of Moral Imbecility." CYRIL BURT, M. HAMBLIN SMITH, W. REES THOMAS, F. C. SHRUBSALL and A. F. TREDGOLD.

April 28th. What is a Mental Illness? By N. H. M. BURKE.

May 26th. The Psycho-Analytical Technique as a Scientific Method. By JOHN RICKMAN.

June 23rd. Some Aspects of Bisexuality. By DOUGLAS BRYAN.

October 21st. The Experimental Psychology of Handwriting. By ROBERT SAUDEK.

November 23rd. Current Tendencies in American Criminology. By BERNARD GLÜCK.

December 15th. *Annual Meeting.* Address from the Chair. The Conception of Dissociation. By BERNARD HART.

[1] Addresses from the Chair at the Annual Meeting began from this date.

1927

January 26th. An Attempt to Investigate and Treat Cases of Psychoneuroses and Psychoses at an Out-Patient Clinic. By T. S. Good; discussion by Edward Mapother, H. Crichton Miller and John Rickman.

February 23rd. Observations on the Formation and Function of the Super-Ego in Normal and Abnormal Mental States. By Sylvia M. Payne.

March 23rd. Criminal Tendencies in Normal Children. By Melanie Klein.

April 27th. Behaviour Sequelae in Encephalitis. By F. C. Shrubsall.

May 25th. An Experiment at Fontainebleau—a Personal Anamnesis. By James Young.

June 13th. The Adaptation of the Family to the Child. By Sandor Ferenczi.

October 26th. A Case of Claustrophobia. By Emanuel Miller.

November 23rd. Psychological Aspects of Birth Control. By M. D. Eder.

December 19th. *Annual Meeting.* Address from the Chair. The Reliability of Infantile Memories. By J. A. Hadfield.

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